Mass. Supreme Judicial Court hears arguments on ‘transferred intent’ in self-defense killings

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court on Tuesday heard competing proposals over whether an attacker’s intent should transfer when a person acting in self defense unintentionally kills an innocent bystander in the defender’s attempt to repel an attack.

At the start of argument in Commonwealth v. Kenneth Jose Santana Rodriguez, defense counsel Attorney K. Kevin Hagan asked the court to “adopt transferred intent self defense, in Massachusetts in 1 of the following possible 2 flavors,” saying one option would be to treat transferred intent as a complete defense and, alternatively, to treat reckless applications as a lesser manslaughter offense. “The first flavor is to adopt transferred intent self defense as a complete defense,” Hagan told the court.

The issue is whether, and how, a defendant who lawfully uses force against an assailant but unintentionally kills a third person should be charged: acquitted, convicted of manslaughter, or prosecuted for a higher form of homicide. Hagan urged the court to recognize either (1) a complete defense when the defender acts without recklessness, or (2) a partial defense that reduces criminal exposure to involuntary manslaughter where the defender’s conduct was reckless.

Hagan relied on authorities and commentary that treat self defense as negating malice, citing Commonwealth v. Conley, 377 Mass. 527 (1979), and analogues in other jurisdictions and scholarship, including LeFebvre and the Model Penal Code. He said Pennsylvania courts have applied a full transferred-intent self-defense doctrine and argued that where a defendant was “truly defending themselves” and not reckless, mitigation is appropriate because “we don’t call that person a murderer.” He further pressed that, if the court did not create a full defense, it should at minimum allow a jury to consider involuntary manslaughter where an element of recklessness is present.

Travis Lynch, arguing for the Commonwealth, agreed there may be narrow fact patterns in which a transferred-intent defense could operate as a complete defense but disputed a broad rule that would shelter reckless conduct. "Shooting a gun in a direction where you know that there are people is nothing less than third pronged malice," Lynch told the court, arguing that firing into an occupied space shows the “plain strong likelihood of death” and that prosecutorial theories aiming at depraved‑heart or third‑prong malice remain available when the defender’s conduct displays that level of culpability.

Justices pressed both sides on the appropriate mental‑state standard (negligence, recklessness, or something like a prudence standard), the relationship between transferred intent and traditional malice concepts, and how jury instructions should distinguish accidents from imprudent or reckless uses of force. A justice asked whether the reduction should be to voluntary or involuntary manslaughter; Hagan said the appropriate diminution would be involuntary manslaughter tied to recklessness. The court discussed other states’ approaches: counsel noted Oregon and Kansas have taken narrower statutory approaches and that there is no uniform national rule.

Counsel also debated whether imposing a prudence or negligence overlay on lawful self defense would be new in Massachusetts criminal law and how such a standard could be implemented in jury instructions without unduly constraining a person’s right to defend against an imminent attack. Hagan emphasized that a jury would first have to find the defendant was justified in acting in self defense before any inquiry into recklessness or negligence would follow. Lynch stressed the government’s interest in protecting innocent bystanders and the role of malice‑based homicide doctrines when defendants act with extreme disregard for life.

Neither side asked the court to remand for legislative action; Hagan said the court has evolved self‑defense doctrine in the past and urged a judicial solution, noting the legislature has enacted only limited statutes such as the Castle Doctrine. Both counsel then rested their arguments and the court did not announce a decision at argument’s close.

The court’s forthcoming opinion will address whether and how Massachusetts treats transferred‑intent self defense, a question that will affect homicide charges, jury instructions, and sentencing in cases where an assertedly justified use of force injures or kills an unintended third party.