Alabama Supreme Court Hears Appeal Over Dan Hudson Drive Easement, Curb Cut and Sidewalk Removal

The Supreme Court of Alabama heard oral argument in case SC20240100 over whether a 2018 reciprocal easement bars a curb cut and sidewalk removed on Dan Hudson Drive for a 277-unit apartment project in Birmingham.

The dispute centers on the meaning of "access facilities" in the 2018 easement and whether the trial court erred in denying appellant 790 Montclair LLC a preliminary injunction to stop the developer(the Station and related owners) from using the curb cut and crosswalk. "This case is about the meaning and effect of an unambiguous easement," Carl Smiley, attorney for appellant 790 Montclair LLC, told the court. "We need a ruling that access facilities as used in the 2018 easement includes that sidewalk and curb that the Station demolished and replaced."

The appellant argues the easement's Section 3 prohibition on altering "access facilities" applies to the sidewalk and curb the developer removed and that the trial court misread the document by applying a "materially interfere" standard instead of enforcing the plain terms. In response, Patrick Miller, attorney for the appellees, said the 2018 instrument expressly grants the Station an easement for "ingress, egress, and access using Dan Hudson Drive and the other access facilities that are depicted in Exhibit C," and he argued a curb cut and an ADA-compliant crosswalk are "reasonable and necessary for the use of our easement." Miller added the trial court balanced competing property rights and did not abuse its discretion in denying injunctive relief.

At oral argument the justices pressed both counsel on textual harmonization. Chief Justice Stewart and Justice Cook asked whether the easement's "notwithstanding" clause in Section 2 must yield to the Section 3 restriction on altering access facilities, and whether the phrase "including but not limited to" in Exhibit C expands the definition of access facilities beyond what is drawn on Exhibit C. Smiley told the court that Section 2 begins "subject to the other terms of this agreement, including without limitation, Section 3," and that the documents should be read together so Section 3 limits Section 2. Miller countered that the "notwithstanding" language was intended to preserve easement use so long as there is no material interference with another owner's easement rights.

The record before the court shows the partiesdisagree about what actually happened on the ground and what relief would be appropriate if the easement is read in the appellant's favor. Appellees have described the development as a roughly $60 million project; Miller told the court the Station had already spent about $14 million by the time a temporary restraining order was entered and that construction continued during a subsequent seven-month period while the parties litigated injunctive relief. Smiley disputed the $60 million figure and emphasized that 790 Montclair seeks a legal ruling defining "access facilities" to include the curb and sidewalk on the parcel, not monetary relief.

The transcript and argument record show several procedural developments that shaped the equities: a temporary restraining order (TRO) was entered at one point; the trial court later increased the bond required to maintain the TRO and the plaintiff did not post the increased bond, after which the TRO was lifted and construction resumed. The trial court ultimately denied the preliminary injunction when the buildings were substantially complete; the trial court also found no evidence that the curb cut and crosswalk would materially interfere with 790 Montclair's easement rights. Counsel for the appellees noted that 790 Montclair did not depict the removed curb and sidewalk on its own Exhibit C, which appellees argued undercuts the appellant's textual claim.

Counsel for both sides pointed the court to Alabama case law on injunctive relief and easements. Miller cited Alabama Power Co. v. Drummond and other precedents to support the proposition that minor encroachments do not always warrant injunctions and that courts may decline injunctive relief where damages or nominal monetary relief would suffice. Smiley urged that a correct legal interpretation of the easement is needed on the merits and that, even if the Supreme Court remands, the trial court can fashion equitable relief other than complete removal (for example, requiring remediation plans as in past cases).

No ruling was announced at the argument. The appeal focuses on two legal questions: (1) whether the 2018 reciprocal easementread as a wholedefines "access facilities" to include the curb and sidewalk the Station removed; and (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying a preliminary injunction after balancing the parties' competing interests and considering construction progress and expenditures. The trial-level record also includes pending claims such as a tortious-interference claim and a later decision on any permanent injunction.

If the Supreme Court reverses the trial court's construction of the easement, the case will return to the trial court for reassessment of the equitable balance and possible remedial orders; if the court affirms, the developer's curb cut and crosswalk will remain in place while the underlying claims proceed. The court did not set a date for a decision during the oral argument.