House science hearing urges sustained investment in biotechnology amid security risks and proposed budget cuts
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A joint hearing of House Science, Space, and Technology subcommittees featured bipartisan warnings that U.S. leadership in biotechnology is at risk, cited recommendations from the National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology, and urged sustained federal investment, better standards, and stronger biosecurity measures.
A joint hearing of House Science, Space, and Technology subcommittees on “Pursuing the Golden Age of Innovation: Strategic Priorities in Biotechnology” centered on bipartisan concern that the United States must increase public investment, coordination, and protective standards to preserve scientific leadership and national security.
Members and witnesses said the National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology (NSCEB) report should guide new federal action. Representative Jay Obernolte, presiding as subcommittee chair, opened the hearing by saying the hearing was “critically important” and framed biotechnology as a cross‑cutting strategic field for health, agriculture, manufacturing and national security.
Why it matters: witnesses and lawmakers repeatedly warned that China is rapidly scaling capabilities in biology and that emerging tools — notably artificial intelligence paired with DNA synthesis and automated laboratories — will accelerate discovery while also creating novel dual‑use risks. Several witnesses urged the federal government to fund long‑term basic research, strengthen standards for biological data and manufacturing, and build secure, U.S.‑based production capacity.
Topline evidence and testimony
- National Security concerns and competition: Multiple committee leaders and witnesses cited the NSCEB report and said China’s whole‑of‑nation approach has narrowed the gap in biotechnology. Representative Stevens (ranking member) described biotechnologies as “the next frontier” for jobs and agricultural and manufacturing innovation; other members said Chinese investments and coordinated industrial policy pose strategic challenges. Dr. Drew Endy, a bioengineering researcher and senior fellow, warned that biotechnology innovation can produce “one‑time winner‑take‑all” advantages and compared today’s moment to computing in 1975.
- Federal funding and the budget debate: Several members and witnesses flagged proposed agency cuts in the president’s budget as a near‑term threat to the U.S. research base. Witnesses and lawmakers urged that NSF, DOE and NIST activities that underpin biological R&D be sustained or expanded. Dr. Kelvin Lee, director of the National Institute for Innovation in Manufacturing Biopharmaceuticals (NIMBL), stressed that scaling discoveries into domestic factories requires coordinated long‑term investment and that pilot‑scale programs must be followed by incentives that attract private capital to full‑scale manufacturing.
- Role of DOE national laboratories and data infrastructure: Deborah Gratiot (associate laboratory director for national security at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory) described DOE user facilities (Joint Genome Institute, Environmental Molecular Sciences Laboratory, leadership computing facilities at Oak Ridge and Argonne) as foundational sources of high‑quality biological data, measurement tools, and computing capacity. She and others said that those data and facilities are essential for training AI models and for distinguishing benign from malicious biological signals.
- Standards, data and NIST’s role: Witnesses and members discussed the need for common data standards and measurement frameworks so biological data are interoperable and “AI‑ready.” Several witnesses recommended resourcing NIST to lead federated standards and measurement work for biological data so industry and government alike can share, benchmark and secure datasets.
- Biosecurity, AI and dual use: Committee members repeatedly asked how to balance openness with security. Testimony warned that advances in DNA synthesis and AI could democratize the ability to design or modify biological agents. Dr. Endy and others called for guardrails around AI‑driven design tools and flagged gaps in global manufacturing capacity for DNA as a strategic vulnerability if production shifts offshore.
- Workforce and manufacturing: Witnesses said a resilient U.S. bioeconomy requires both fundamental research and scale‑up facilities. Dr. Lee and others urged more workforce development, including community college and apprenticeship programs, and public‑private partnerships that reduce the “valley of death” between lab discovery and commercial manufacturing.
Selected quotes (attributed)
- “The golden age of innovation for biotechnology is here and it’s essential that the U.S. be at the forefront,” Chairman Obernolte said in opening remarks.
- “Competition in biotechnology is not just a race where if you fall behind, you get to catch up later,” Dr. Drew Endy testified. “When you get a lead, you get to accelerate faster.”
- “The national laboratories stand ready to serve the nation,” Deborah Gratiot said, highlighting lab capabilities to generate data, materials and measurements that industry can leverage.
What the witnesses proposed
Witnesses and members converged on several policy ideas: substantially fund foundational research (including campaigns to better understand the cell and reduce the current “unknown essential genes” gap), build and resource federated standards and measurement capabilities at NIST and DOE user facilities, expand pilot and demonstration manufacturing facilities, strengthen biosecurity screening for DNA synthesis and AI tools, and create a cross‑government coordinating office for biotechnology strategy and implementation.
Outstanding questions and next steps
Lawmakers left the hearing with several tasks: reconcile the NSCEB recommendations with the federal budget process, define what level of federal investment and what specific programs (NSF, DOE, NIST, manufacturing demonstration) should be prioritized, and develop practicable biosecurity measures for DNA synthesis and AI‑driven design tools that do not unduly stifle legitimate research. The committee record will remain open for 10 days for additional written questions and submissions.
The hearing brought bipartisan attention to a fast‑moving field that combines scientific opportunity with complex security tradeoffs. Lawmakers and witnesses urged prompt, sustained, and coordinated federal action to keep the United States at the leading edge while reducing dual‑use risks.
