Appeals Court Weighs Admission of Out‑of‑State 'Other Acts' Evidence and Indictment Amendment in Christopher Eaton Appeal

The Massachusetts Appeals Court panel of Chief Justice Amy Blake, Justice Peter Sachs and Justice Andrew D'Angelo heard argument in Commonwealth v. Christopher Eaton, docket number 24P779, a partially impounded appeal that centers on (1) admission of other‑act (prior bad‑act) evidence, including out‑of‑state conduct, and (2) whether an amendment to the indictment during trial prejudiced the defense.

Scott Gleason, representing Christopher Eaton, asked the panel to reverse or remand on the ground that testimony about incidents in Connecticut—including what defense described as “spooning” involving an adult and a child—was highly prejudicial and that the trial court’s rulings permitted cascades of inference unfavorable to the defendant. Gleason argued portions of the out‑of‑state evidence had not been preserved and said the timing and scope of an amendment to replace alleged dates in the indictment (April → May/June) impaired the defense’s ability to investigate and present exculpatory evidence.

Catherine Jansen, for the Commonwealth, defended the trial court’s rulings. She told the panel the Connecticut evidence was preserved for appeal and was admissible to show the nature of the relationship and the alleged grooming. Jansen argued the record shows disclosure of the Connecticut material, that the trial judge limited or directed the jury to avoid speculation, and that the amendment to the indictment did not prejudice the defendant because the judge instructed jurors not to infer missing records existed and the defense had opportunities to cross‑examine.

A recurring factual thread in argument concerned a trip to a resort (referred to in the transcript as “Cocoa Key/Cocoa Cay”), where the defense said investigators had not found reservations or records for certain weekends. The panel discussed whether the trial judge’s jury instruction — a passage taken from the record in which the judge said jurors must accept that no corroborative records were presented for Cocoa Key in May and June and thus “for purposes of determining whether the Commonwealth has met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, they do not exist” — effectively remedied any prejudice from a late amendment.

The justices probed preservation of objections to multiple categories of other‑act evidence, whether the Connecticut evidence was necessary for the Commonwealth to present a coherent narrative, and whether the trial judge exercised appropriate discretion under the applicable evidence rules. Both counsel acknowledged the difficulty of these cases for parties and jurors; the panel asked several specific questions about what records were sought pretrial, motions in limine, a bill of particulars, and the dates and scope of the amended counts.

At the close of argument the panel took the matter under advisement; no decision was announced.