Citizen Portal
Sign In

Get Full Government Meeting Transcripts, Videos, & Alerts Forever!

Get email alerts on the Nrc Physical Security topic

No spam. Unsubscribe anytime.

NRC outlines security requirements, DBT and rulemaking for small modular reactors

3491871 · May 23, 2025
AI-Generated Content: All content on this page was generated by AI to highlight key points from the meeting. For complete details and context, we recommend watching the full video. so we can fix them.

Summary

An NRC regional liaison told the Wyoming Minerals committee about the agency's physical security framework — anchored in 10 CFR Part 73 and the 'design basis threat' — and described ongoing rulemaking to scale security requirements for smaller and advanced reactors.

Ryan Alexander, regional State and Government Liaison Officer for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Region IV office, gave the committee a high‑level briefing on federal security requirements for fixed nuclear facilities and on NRC rulemaking for next‑generation reactors.

Alexander told lawmakers that the underpinning of NRC security requirements is contained in Title 10, Part 73 of the Code of Federal Regulations and centers on the ‘‘design basis threat’’ (DBT), the agency's term for the set of capabilities that a licensee must defend against. He said licensees must design, maintain and have NRC oversight of systems that "provide a high assurance that activities involving special nuclear material support the common defense and security and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety." Alexander also explained that Part 73 requires plans and systems to detect, assess, interdict and neutralize threats up to and including the DBT, and that the agency conducts regular inspections and force‑on‑force exercises to verify readiness.

On advanced technologies, Alexander described two parallel NRC rulemaking efforts: a limited rule to allow voluntary, alternative physical security requirements for small modular and advanced reactors that have lower potential radiological consequences and more integrated security design features; and a broader Part 53 licensing framework being developed to provide a technology‑inclusive, risk‑informed route for advanced reactor licensing. He said those rulemakings aim to permit performance‑based and scalable approaches while maintaining a commensurate level of protection.

Alexander emphasized the DBT’s expectations for licensees to consider "well‑trained adversaries" and to include insider‑threat and cyber scenarios in security planning. He said NRC staff coordinate with federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies on threat assessments and can order licensees to make plan changes if the threat environment shifts. The NRC presentation framed security as an ongoing oversight activity, not a one‑time approval.

Committee members asked about timing for plan submissions and who bears responsibility for long‑term security costs if an operator ceases operations; Alexander said security plans are reviewed as part of operating license applications, and that license transfers or sales (and NRC licensing steps) are used to ensure continued stewardship, with the regulator engaged if a company files for bankruptcy.

The NRC briefing supplied technical context to later testimony on security immunity and to questions about local law enforcement capacity to respond to on‑site incidents.