Vermont committee debates constitutionality, enforcement of bill requiring disclosures for synthetic election media

Members of the Government Operations & Military Affairs Committee on May 7 debated whether S.23 draft 2.1, a bill that would require disclosures for deceptive or synthetic media used in elections, is constitutional and how it should be enforced.

The committee heard legal analysis and enforcement advice from outside counsel and the Attorney General's Office that the bill, as written, likely raises First Amendment concerns and needs clearer civil investigatory tools and confidentiality protections. "This bill is restricting speech," said Rick Segal, counsel with the Office of Williamson, as he reviewed court rulings in California, Texas and Minnesota that challenged similar statutes.

The question of narrow tailoring dominated the discussion. Segal summarized federal litigation trends, citing Coles v. Bonta and recent Texas and Minnesota rulings, and warned that broad definitions that capture routine political persuasion could sweep in protected speech. He told the committee that courts have repeatedly signaled skepticism when statutes regulate a wide range of political communications rather than narrowly defined, demonstrably false statements that cause a specific, legally cognizable harm.

Leslie Wells, assistant attorney general, told lawmakers the bill's current drafting "heavily implies that enforcement will be done through criminal" processes and recommended clarifying that civil investigation and enforcement are also available. Wells said the Attorney General's Office prefers language that would allow civil investigative tools, protect information provided during investigations from public-records disclosure, and replace criminal-oriented terms (for example, changing "penalties" to "remedies" and "conviction" to "violation") to make the statutory enforcement posture clearer.

Committee members pressed on several specifics: the bill's 90-day pre-election disclosure window, the definition of "deceptive and fraudulent synthetic media," and whether parity, parody and satire should remain excluded. Representative Hooper said he has "a real issue with the notion that people, particularly politicians, having the right to lie," and asked for a more robust definition of the statute's demonstrably false or misleading elements and for clarification about false-advertising analogues.

Segal and committee members discussed possible adjustments: shortening the 90-day window, tightening the definition of deceptive media to target demonstrably false claims intended to defraud voters (rather than routine persuasion), and explicitly excluding protected parody and satire. Segal offered to return with refined language and cited that making the statute time-limited and narrowing the scope would help make it more likely to survive constitutional challenge.

No motions or votes were taken. Committee members agreed to continue work on the measure: Segal offered to draft a narrower definition and false-advertising comparison for a future meeting, and the Attorney General's Office indicated it had sent proposed enforcement-language changes to legislative counsel. Representative Boyden, identified by committee staff as the bill's primary sponsor, planned follow-up conversations with committee members after the hearing.

The discussion combined constitutional law concerns (First Amendment and federal-court litigation trends), practical enforcement questions (civil versus criminal tools, records confidentiality), and policy choices about scope and timing of disclosure requirements. Committee members asked staff and counsel to return with tightened statutory language and implementation details before advancing the bill.