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Attorneys debate severability of Massachusetts resident firearms licensing after Bruin and Donald arguments

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Summary

At oral argument, Nancy Dolberg asked the Supreme Judicial Court to vacate Nathaniel Rodriguez’s firearms convictions under statutory provisions referenced as 269:10(a) and (n), arguing Massachusetts’ resident licensing scheme contains discretionary language the court found unconstitutional in Bruin.

At oral argument, Nancy Dolberg asked the Supreme Judicial Court to vacate Nathaniel Rodriguez’s firearms convictions under statutory provisions referenced in argument as 269:10(a) and (n) and to find the resident licensing scheme unconstitutional as applied or facially invalid.

Dolberg said the resident licensing language at issue tracked the discretionary “good reason” language the court invalidated in Bruin and argued that, if excised, the statute would leave no meaningful pathway for licenses and would amount to an impermissible ban. She told the court the resident licensing provisions (discussed in argument as sections of chapter 131) included discretionary terms and that the text and effect resemble regimes this court and the U.S. Supreme Court have recently scrutinized.

Assistant District Attorney Aaron Staudinger urged the court to distinguish the resident scheme from the nonresident licensing regime addressed in Donald and said the challenged resident provisions are severable: removing the Bruin-targeted language would leave a licensing regime that can operate as a shall-issue system for applicants who are not prohibited persons. Staudinger said, “you can readily sever that language and be left with a statute that would be that would be licensing, if not a prohibited person,” and argued that prohibited-person categories are a plainly legitimate sweep of the statute.

Counsel debated whether this challenge had to be treated as a facial attack or an as-applied one, and whether prior proceedings (Donald, Bruin and related authorities) control the result. Dolberg pressed that Bruin’s reasoning undermines any regime that vests substantial discretion in the licensing authority, while Staudinger pointed to statutory provisions that define prohibited persons and analogies in Rahimi and other cases upholding categorical prohibitions.

The justices asked about severability and whether a remand would be the appropriate remedy if the court concluded previous precedent required further factual development. No final disposition was announced from the bench; the court heard argument on whether sections of the licensing statute must be severed or invalidated and whether a remand for further findings is required.