House subcommittee examines evidence of Chinese signals-intelligence activity in Cuba and risks to U.S. homeland

The House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security convened a hearing to examine open-source evidence and expert analysis suggesting Chinese-funded signals‑intelligence facilities in Cuba and what that could mean for U.S. homeland security.

The discussion centered on commercial satellite imagery and public reporting identifying four likely sites on the island and the potential for those sites to collect communications and maritime data. Committee Chair Jimenez opened the hearing by warning that "With Beijing ramping up its economic, military and intelligence operations just 90 miles from our coastline, this is no longer a distant challenge. It's an immediate concern for the security of the American people." The subcommittee heard testimony from three outside experts who recommended classified briefings for members, stepped-up regional diplomacy and technical measures to protect sensitive systems.

A nut graf: Witnesses from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Heritage Foundation and Florida International University told the panel they had used commercially available imagery and open-source reporting to identify and track about four Cuban sites they consider likely to support Chinese signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection. They said the facilities could have implications for U.S. military operations, commercial shipping, launch ranges and other sensitive communications, and urged a combination of intelligence sharing, transparency where appropriate, and technical mitigation.

In testimony, Dr. Ryan Berg, director of the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said CSIS identified four likely facilities and presented updated imagery. Berg described one site, El Salao, as showing signs of abandonment after public reporting and recommended that "classified briefing to every member of Congress should be given" while also considering "strategic declassification of images" to deter further construction. Berg also recommended defining red lines for permanent PLA basing and hardening U.S. regional infrastructure against SIGINT collection.

Andres Martinez Fernandez, senior policy analyst for Latin America at the Heritage Foundation, told the panel that the Beijing‑Havana relationship has moved beyond economic ties and into political and clandestine cooperation. Leland Lazarus, associate director of national security at Florida International University's Gordon Institute for Public Policy, called Cuba "a strategic beachhead," and said Chinese firms already present in Cuban ports, airports and telecom networks create persistent vectors for intelligence collection.

Ranking Member MacGyver raised concerns about Chinese scanning and screening systems deployed in Cuban transportation hubs, saying, "The Department of Homeland Security has assessed that NUPTECH screening systems likely have deficiencies in detection capabilities and that China could potentially access the systems remotely to gather intelligence on shipping, manifest, and passenger information." Witnesses linked commercial tech deployments, including equipment from Nuctech (Tsinghua‑affiliated) and telecom vendors, to broader Chinese access to data flows.

Members asked about specific technical capabilities and countermeasures. Witnesses said commercially available imagery and open‑source reporting can identify sites and track changes but that intelligence agencies likely hold further technical details. Berg and others recommended classified briefings to provide members with the fuller intelligence picture and proposed exercises to "harden sensitive infrastructure" and identify vulnerabilities.

Committee members and witnesses discussed related regional issues: China’s broader investment in Latin America and the Caribbean, U.S. development and aid policies (including a 2023 USAID funding figure for the Western Hemisphere cited in testimony), and the strategic implications for ports and transit routes that support U.S. force deployment. Witnesses noted prior public reporting: a June 8, 2023 Wall Street Journal article and subsequent CSIS reporting that tracked construction and activity at four sites, including imagery updates through December 2024 and site‑specific observations as of April 18, 2025.

The hearing closed with the chair saying the committee will pursue a classified setting to examine intelligence in greater depth. The chair also invited written follow‑up from witnesses and left the hearing record open for 10 days; the subcommittee then adjourned.

Ending: The public record from this hearing is primarily witness testimony and open‑source imagery cited by witnesses; the committee signaled plans for additional classified review and follow‑up from witnesses in writing.