Montana justices consider challenge to forced Zoom appearance in TW commitment case

At oral argument before the Montana Supreme Court in cause number DA22-0645, appellant and respondent TW asked the court to reverse her involuntary commitment, arguing the district court unlawfully forced her to remain visible and audible on Zoom despite her express, repeated request to waive appearance.

Miss Peterson, counsel for TW, told the court: “The state cannot compel a respondent who knowingly wishes to waive their appearance at trial to be jury need for commitment for being unable to care for her basic needs.” She argued the district court required TW’s video and audio to remain on so the jury could “inspect TW for mental defects,” and that forcing the connection violated statutory waiver provisions and the statute’s directive to administer the civil‑commitment scheme “with full respect for the person’s dignity and personal integrity.”

The petitioners' argument centered on statutory interpretation of multiple provision citations raised at argument (transcript citations rendered in the record as "53 21 1 19," "53 21 1 40," and the broader purposes statement "53 21 1 01"). Peterson told the court the relevant waiver provision has been consistently read by the court to limit the judge’s discretion to ensuring any waiver is knowing and voluntary; she said TW was a capable respondent who had unequivocally objected to appearing by Zoom and was nonetheless required by the district court to remain on the connection with video and audio active.

At oral argument a justice asked whether the statute “neatly applies” to the facts and noted the record contains no controlling case directly on point; Peterson conceded there was no exact precedent addressing the precise fact pattern but cited the court’s prior waiver jurisprudence (referenced in argument as decisions from 2009, 2013 and 2018) to support the position that a capable respondent may knowingly waive presence without having to be physically present to do so.

Assistant Attorney General Thad Guder, for the state, defended the district court’s handling and told the justices the statutory scheme points to a single, statutorily specified mechanism for waiving the respondent’s physical presence: concurrence of the respondent’s attorney and friend, and the court’s concurrence, referenced in argument as "119.2" in the record. Guder also urged the court that one statutory provision the state relied on (discussed as 1 40 in the argument) was not clearly applicable here, and that the district court acted within its statutory discretion in ordering TW’s appearance by two‑way electronic audio‑visual communication or making her physically present in court.

Justices pressed both sides on the statutory text and on practical consequences: whether allowing a respondent to hide from observation would undermine the jury’s role in a commitment case, and conversely whether compelling visual inspection by jurors risks turning a fragile respondent into an “exhibit” and thus prejudicing the factfinder. Peterson argued the district court’s order “spotlighted TW herself by her video and on from a separate room,” while the state countered that the jury must be able to observe comportment as part of weighing evidence and that the record of in‑court behavior was limited and not necessarily prejudicial.

Peterson asked, should the court rely on a statutory provision not briefed by the parties, for leave to submit supplemental briefing to protect TW’s due‑process rights. The case was submitted at the end of argument; the justices did not announce a decision.

Why this matters: The court’s interpretation will affect how Montana judges manage appearances by respondents in involuntary‑commitment hearings when remote two‑way audiovisual technology is used, and will clarify the permissible scope of waivers of presence and the balance between a respondent’s dignity and a factfinder’s ability to observe behavior.

The record shows argument focused on statutory text and precedent rather than a contested vote or dispositive ruling; the court took the matter under advisement and submitted the case.