Citizen Portal
Sign In

Get Full Government Meeting Transcripts, Videos, & Alerts Forever!

Get email alerts on the Civil Protection Orders topic

No spam. Unsubscribe anytime.

Senate Judiciary reviews H.222 changes to stalking definition, vehicle possession and domestic-violence accountability programs

3124143 · April 25, 2025
AI-Generated Content: All content on this page was generated by AI to highlight key points from the meeting. For complete details and context, we recommend watching the full video. so we can fix them.

Summary

The Senate Judiciary Committee on April 25 reviewed H.222, a bill that would amend Vermont's civil protection statutes to broaden the stalking definition to capture some device-enabled surveillance, allow temporary vehicle possession in protection orders, and permit courts to order completion of certified domestic violence accountability programs as a civil condition.

The Senate Judiciary Committee on April 25 reviewed H.222, a bill that would amend Vermont's civil protection statutes to (1) broaden the "course of conduct" definition used for stalking to include some forms of electronic and device-enabled surveillance, (2) allow courts to award temporary possession of a vehicle to a plaintiff in both final and ex parte relief-from-abuse orders when necessary to escape or prevent abuse, and (3) permit a judge to require a defendant to complete a domestic violence accountability program (DVAP) approved by the Vermont Council on Domestic Violence as a condition of a civil protection order.

Committee staff member Michelle Childs, Office of Legislative Counsel, told the panel the bill amends the Title 12 stalking provisions that are cross-referenced by Title 15 domestic-relief-from-abuse statutes. "We're talking about orders against stalking or [sexual] assault," Childs said, and noted the primary change is to the statutory definition of "course of conduct," which currently requires two or more acts over any period of time or continuous electronic surveillance for 12 hours or more. Childs said the change is intended to capture evolving electronic monitoring techniques.

The change would treat some forms of unauthorized digital monitoring'for example, software or apps that continuously surveil a person's internet or wireless activity'as fitting the statutory "course of conduct" when the other elements of stalking are present, specifically that the conduct causes a reasonable person to fear for their safety or suffer substantial emotional distress.

Carly Wasserman, policy director at the Vermont Network Against Domestic and Sexual Violence, told the committee that advocates and the Domestic Violence Fatality Review Commission recommended the change to address a gap in practice. "When a device like an AirTag or a tracking app is placed once and then used to continuously surveil a person, there has been some confusion in the courts of whether those activities meet the threshold of that course of conduct," Wasserman said. She described DVAPs as community-based programs certified by the Vermont Council on Domestic Violence and noted last-year referral statistics: about 85 percent of participants were referred as a condition of probation, 11 percent by the Department for Children and Families, and 3 percent were self-referred.

On vehicle possession, Childs explained the bill would add explicit statutory authority for courts to award temporary possession of a vehicle to a plaintiff in a final relief-from-abuse order and in ex parte (emergency) orders. Ex parte orders, she said, remain time-limited (14 days) and require a judicial finding of immediate danger; for emergency vehicle possession the statute would add that the court must find the vehicle is necessary to escape abuse or prevent further abuse before awarding possession. For final orders, courts would evaluate whether the plaintiff is the vehicle'owner or joint owner, the primary payer on the loan, has primary possession or control, or has been restricted from using the vehicle by the defendant; the presence of any one of those factors could support awarding possession.

Committee members raised practical concerns about connected-vehicle features and third-party services such as OnStar that can allow remote tracking. Wasserman pointed to related legislation (H.223) and examples from other states: "California and New York have passed laws that outline a process that car manufacturers must go through if a survivor of domestic violence requests that their connected vehicle access is severed," she said, noting the committee might need education if H.222 advances.

Regarding DVAPs, the bill would allow a judge to order a defendant to complete a certified program as a condition of a civil protection order. Childs explained the House Judiciary Committee intentionally made noncompletion of DVAPs a civil-enforcement matter: failure to complete the program would not be a criminal violation of the protection order misdemeanor provision but could subject the defendant to civil contempt or be considered by a court when deciding whether to extend or modify an order. Wasserman said survivors had asked for this option because many who seek civil protection orders do not pursue parallel criminal charges and currently lack a referral pathway into certified DVAPs.

The bill also would require the Domestic Violence Fatality Review Commission to include in its findings the number of defendants ordered to complete a DVAP and the number who completed one, a reporting change intended to give the legislature data to evaluate how the approach is working.

Committee members asked for more testimony from practitioners and the Council on Domestic Violence about program capacity, the DBAP certification process, and court implementation details. No formal committee action or vote was recorded in the transcript.

The committee's discussion emphasized the statutory context and judicial discretion: committee staff repeatedly noted that awarding vehicle possession or other relief would depend on the court's factual findings and that the stalking change must still be applied in light of the stalking statute's existing elements (fear for safety or substantial emotional distress).