Mass. high court hears whether DOR can enforce repayment after retroactive termination of child support

The Supreme Judicial Court on Monday heard arguments in SJC-13687 over whether the Massachusetts Department of Revenue(DOR) may use its child-support enforcement powers to collect money a court later ruled should not have been ordered as child support.

At oral argument, David Kravitz, an attorney for the DOR Child Support Enforcement Division, told the court the agency's statutory remedies"range from wage assignment to liens, levies, attaching assets, driver's licenses, passports" and "are all devoted to the enforcement of child support orders." He said those remedies are "cabined" to enforcement of support and therefore do not reach a debt created by a retroactive termination of a support order.

The question reached the high court after a probate and family court judge entered a retroactive termination that, according to the parties' filings, produced a substantial judgment in favor of the obligor. The obligor and a separate pro se party who says she paid into the account dispute how much is owed and whether DOR may step in to collect the repayment.

The dispute turned on statutory interpretation. Kravitz argued the remaining sums created by the probate court's retroactive termination are a private debt between the parties, not a support obligation "for the support and maintenance of a child," and thus outside DOR's enforcement authority. "When a...termination...goes into place, it creates a debt, but the creation of that debt doesn't have anything to do with supporting and maintaining a child," Kravitz said.

The obligor and the parent seeking repayment pressed the court with practical concerns. The obligor, identified in the transcript as Mr. Jeevan Emden, said he has been paying child support for years and that the probate judge adjusted uninsured medical cost sharing from 50% to 80% because the child has complex medical needs. The parent who reported payment activity to DOR, identified in the transcript as Miss Barathan, described taking unpaid leave and significant out-of-pocket medical costs and disputed the total figures reported by the parties.

Numbers cited in the argument include a Department of Revenue report listing $12,970.71 as the amount to be reimbursed and an appellee figure of $15,821.06. The transcript shows Miss Barathan stated she mailed a $1,000 check on April 1, 2024, and provided a medical invoice of $3,933; it also records an 80% share figure of $3,146.76 tied to uncovered medical costs. The parties and the court acknowledged that exact accounting and offsets are matters the probate and family court could address.

Justices asked whether an offset mechanism or a later support order could fold an overpayment back into enforceable child-support obligations, and whether federal auditing or funding conditions could be implicated if DOR declined to enforce reimbursements. Kravitz acknowledged federal audits of the child-support system and said DOR is "mindful of our federal obligations," but told the court he was not aware of an instance in which federal funding was cut for enforcing the statute the DOR administers.

The panel also discussed alternative remedies available to a judgment creditor, such as pursuit in probate and family court and traditional post-judgment collection tools. Kravitz emphasized that while the probate court's judgment may create collection remedies for the payee, those remedies are those of a private judgment creditor, not the specialized enforcement powers granted to the DOR.

The court took no decision at the end of the argument in the transcript excerpt. The issues raised include statutory scopewhether the statutory definition of "support" and DOR's enforcement authority reach reimbursements ordered after a retroactive terminationand potential practical effects on parties with ongoing medical or other child-related obligations.

The case record and oral argument show factual disputes about the exact sums, timing of payments, and whether offsets were sought or ordered in the probate proceeding; those factual and procedural matters remain subject to the record before the court.