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Witnesses describe military‑civil fusion, mass technology theft and call for export controls, tariffs and investment screening
Summary
Panelists told the committee that China’s military‑civil fusion strategy leverages access to U.S. research, commercial markets and supply chains; they urged export controls, outbound investment screening, targeted tariffs and other tools to deny Beijing the technologies it seeks.
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Witnesses used the hearing to describe how China’s industrial and security policy converts market access and academic research into military advantage. Craig Singleton of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies said Chinese leader Xi Jinping had declared technological innovation the “main battlefield” and linked that doctrine to China’s military‑civil fusion programs. Dr. Michael Pillsbury testified that the PRC’s strategy is “comprehensive” and extends well beyond traditional military competition.
Witnesses cited large-scale technology transfer and intellectual‑property theft. William Evanina offered figures witnesses used throughout the hearing, including estimates of economic losses from IP theft in the hundreds of billions of dollars annually; Dr. Evanina told the committee that translates, per witness testimony, to roughly $4,000–$6,000 per year for an average family of four. Members and witnesses repeatedly pointed to semiconductors, advanced sensors, batteries and AI as sectors at risk.
Members discussed policy levers. Several witnesses and lawmakers urged strengthening export controls and outbound‑investment screening and codifying executive tools currently used to block risky information‑communication goods. Representative Michael McCaul and other members referenced the Chips Act and recent semiconductor investments; witnesses and members proposed targeted tariffs and “component tariffs” to prevent China from hiding restricted components inside foreign goods. Dr. Pillsbury and others supported prohibiting sales of certain military‑grade AI and advanced chips to China.
Speakers also raised private‑sector dependencies. Multiple witnesses named specific companies and sectors (for example, large PRC battery firms and telecom equipment vendors) as sources of strategic leverage. Craig Singleton said China’s reliance on access to U.S. capital markets and technology supplies is a vulnerability the United States can exploit with a coordinated set of economic‑statecraft measures. Several members pointed to current and proposed mechanisms: CFIUS reviews, outbound investment screening, enhanced export controls, and legislation discussed in testimony such as the Enforce Act.

