Tennessee appeals court hears dispute over whether offender established new residence for registry reporting

Oral arguments in a Tennessee appellate panel on Oct. 12, 2025, examined whether Tony Brasfield established a new residence that he was required to report under Tennessee Code Annotated § 40‑39‑203(a)(1). William Gill, counsel for the appellant, told the court the record lacks evidence that Brasfield established a new primary residence in Tennessee or a secondary residence in Mississippi and asked the court to reverse the trial court’s conviction on count 2.

The question matters because § 40‑39‑203(a)(1) requires an offender to report within 48 hours after establishing or changing a primary residence, defined in the statute as a place in the state where the offender resides for at least five consecutive days. Counsel for the State, Kirby May, argued the evidence—viewed in the light most favorable to the State—supported the jury’s verdict and that Brasfield’s actions, including cutting off GPS monitoring and failing to report, support affirmance.

Gill laid out the timeline that the parties rely on: the GPS-monitoring data showed Brasfield left his Madison County address on March 9, 2019, went to Lawrenceburg for two days, and then traveled to Mississippi on March 11. The record is “silent” as to where in Mississippi Brasfield was or how long he remained there, Gill said. The officer who monitored compliance testified that a violation report was prepared on March 21, 2019, and the next reported address in the record was incarceration at Bledsoe Correctional Facility in April.

Gill argued the State’s trial theory was limited to A1 (the in‑state primary residence provision) and that the proof is insufficient to show the required five consecutive in‑state days in any new Tennessee residence. He also urged that the State’s alternative theory—A3, governing moves out of state—was not included in the indictment and thus cannot supply the basis for conviction on count 2. “All we know here is that Mr. Brasfield went to Mississippi for an unknown number of days,” Gill said, urging the court to reverse and set aside the conviction in count 2.

May responded that the indictment charged a failure to report within 48 hours of establishing or changing a primary or secondary residence and that the jury heard the A1 theory. He emphasized the officer’s testimony and the monitoring report, saying the record supports an inference that Brasfield abandoned his reported Madison County residence, removed the GPS monitoring device, and later was found in Mississippi. May acknowledged alternative theories involving out‑of‑state moves were available but said the trial proceeded under § 40‑39‑203(a)(1) and the evidence presented should support the conviction when viewed favorably to the State.

Defense counsel and the panel questioned the evidentiary gaps: the GPS data’s details about locations in Mississippi were not in the record, testimony about removal of the GPS device appears primarily in a redacted report rather than live testimony, and there was only one trial witness who tracked movement. Gill and an additional appellant speaker, Mr. Gilpin, told the court the cited cases (including State v. Sykes and State v. McGill) show sparser proofs have been found insufficient and that the present record is weaker.

The court did not announce a decision at the argument’s close. After the parties concluded, the presiding judge said the Court would take the matter under advisement. A written opinion will determine whether the appellate court affirms or reverses the conviction on count 2.

Votes at a glance: no votes or formal rulings were issued at the hearing; the panel took oral argument and reserved decision for a later written opinion.