Supreme Judicial Court hears argument on whether utility lineman’s COVID-19 illness is a work-related personal injury

Attorney John Kaniff, representing Travelers Insurance, told the Supreme Judicial Court that the central question in Stacy v. Unitil is whether the administrative factfinder erred in concluding the employee’s COVID-19 infection was a compensable personal injury under the workers’ compensation statute.

The case turns on the first sentence of G.L. c. 152, § 17A, which Kaniff summarized as applying to a “personal injury that stems from an infectious or contagious disease if the nature of the employment is such that the hazard of contracting such diseases by an employee is inherent in the employment.” Kaniff urged the court to treat the statutory phrase as a question of law for the courts, not one that the Industrial Accident Reviewing Board should resolve with deference, saying, “this is interpretation of the statute and that's deferred… left to the courts, not to the Industrial Accident Reviewing Board.”

Attorney Joe McKenna, representing Jeff Stacy, urged a broader reading. McKenna emphasized that the statute’s language is expansive and that the trier of fact should determine whether the infection “stems from” the infectious disease given the time, place and manner of the worker’s tasks. “The issue in this case is really the definition of, infectious disease. And it's an expansive one,” McKenna told the court, and argued the linemen were required to work in close, congregate conditions that nonremote workers did not face.

Justices pressed both sides on two linked issues that recur through the argument: (1) whether an employee’s duties are, by their nature, inherently hazardous with respect to infectious disease, and (2) if the worker was “essential” at the time of infection, whether that status changes the statutory analysis. Justice Wendland and another justice (referred to in argument as Justice Duer) asked whether the governor’s COVID-19 executive orders and the state’s phased reopenings should inform the meaning of “inherent” in the statute.

Kaniff argued that the executive orders are factual aids but do not change the statutory text; he told the court the Administrative Judge mistakenly equated the label “essential workforce” with the statutory concept of an employment hazard that is inherent. Kaniff also noted timing: the record shows Stacy’s infection occurred in February 2021, after phased reopenings, and cited COVID Order No. 13’s rescission via a later order (referred to as Order No. 37) effective June 8, 2020, as part of his explanation that the landscape of who was “essential” shifted.

McKenna countered that many utility and other frontline workers “had no choice” but to go to work throughout the pandemic and that the governor’s orders initially singled out categories of workers who were required to continue in-person work and thereby faced heightened risk. He asked the court to accept the trier of fact’s findings about congregate working conditions and the timing of exposure, noting that, in his view, the record shows close working conditions and limited PPE in the pandemic’s early months.

Both attorneys acknowledged unresolved questions about deference to the reviewing board’s factual findings and the limited case law interpreting the infectious-disease sentence of § 17A; Kaniff pointed to only a handful of prior cases and argued statutory interpretation is for the court. McKenna emphasized factual issues that, he said, made the board’s findings appropriate to uphold.

The justices repeatedly framed hypotheticals—e.g., whether an infection that occurred a day before a state-of-emergency declaration should be covered—highlighting the court’s concern about bright-line rules and the possibility that a broad reading could apply across many workers who returned during phased reopenings. Neither side conceded the court should issue a categorical rule; both sought guidance on whether the court should defer to factual findings about how the work was performed during the pandemic.

The argument closed without a decision; counsel for both sides asked the court to adopt the legal standard favorable to their client and to resolve how executive orders and the timing of reopenings interface with the statutory language. The court took the case under advisement.