Baltimore County Board of Appeals denies respondents' motion to dismiss in Laurindale Club floodplain permit dispute

The Baltimore County Board of Appeals on Dec. 19, 2024, denied respondents’ motion to dismiss a petition challenging a Permits, Approvals and Inspections (PAI) determination that a floodplain waiver or variance was not required for proposed fencing at the Laurindale Club of Ruxton, 7611 Laurindale Club Road (ZIP 21204), case CBA 2052. The panel convened the deliberation by WebEx at 9:32 a.m.

Panel members debated whether the petitioners had legal standing and whether the petition was filed within the 30-day deadline from the permit issuance. Respondents argued the petitioners lacked standing under Baltimore County Code provisions that limit appeals of building permits to the permit applicant and that a later “clarification” filed by petitioners was untimely. Petitioners’ counsel, Mr. McCann, said the appeal was of a PAI determination related to the permit rather than an appeal of the building permit itself.

Why it matters: denying the motion keeps the petition alive so the board can hear the merits of whether PAI properly declined to require a floodplain waiver or variance for the proposed fencing. That decision could affect the property owner’s obligations and whether neighbors or other parties may challenge similar permit-related determinations.

Board members outlined the key procedural facts on the record. The permit at issue was issued on May 28, 2024; petitioners filed an initial notice of appeal on June 27, 2024, which respondents and PAI characterized as an appeal of the permit and which PAI returned with payment refunded. Petitioners then submitted what they described as a clarification of that appeal on Aug. 5, 2024. Respondents contended the Aug. 5 filing was a new, untimely appeal.

Chair Sharan Benardi framed the respondents’ motion as resting on two points: lack of standing because, she said, “only the applicant for the building permit may appeal to the County Board of Appeals,” and untimeliness of the later filing. She said, if the petition were only an impermissible appeal of a permit grant, the board would lack jurisdiction. But she also emphasized caution about dismissing matters without full consideration of the merits and timeline.

Board member Michael Stelmack (identified in the record as Mr. Stelmack) urged a different reading. He distinguished the county code section that limits appeals of permit denials to applicants from a separate, broader code provision allowing “anyone aggrieved by a decision of the director” to appeal. Stelmack concluded the issuance of a permit can itself be “a decision” and therefore that the petitioners could have standing to appeal PAI’s determination. He cited a Maryland appellate decision, United Parcel Service v. People’s Counsel, 336 Md. 569 (1994), noting that case involved neighbors appealing a grant of a building permit and that the court’s reasoning supported permitting non-applicants to appeal certain director decisions tied to a permit.

Stelmack summarized the procedural posture and the notice standard: unlike appeals specifically limited to permit applicants, the broader appeals provision requires only that an aggrieved party file a written notice within 30 days and does not demand the same “clear and concise” grounds language required for permit-appeal filings. “I think the language that he uses in the appeal makes it clear that that’s what he’s talking about,” Stelmack said of the June 27 notice. He added, “I think that those determinations are the implicit determination there is whether or not to require a waiver or variance,” and concluded the June 27 filing was sufficient to give notice.

Another panelist voiced initial concern about timeliness and the clarity of the filings but said the court authority and the record persuaded them to deny the motion and schedule a full hearing so the board could examine the merits and hear additional witnesses, including the PAI director if necessary. The panel agreed the department should not have summarily returned the initial filing without leaving the question of jurisdiction to the board.

Outcome and next steps: The board announced that it would deny the respondents’ motion to dismiss and that the matter will proceed to a hearing. The board directed that its written order document the deliberation and the reasons for denying dismissal; members said the hearing will allow both procedural briefing (including timeliness and standing) and testimony on the merits, with the option to call the PAI director for additional factual clarification. No hearing date was specified on the record.

Court and code references discussed on the record include Baltimore County Code provisions cited by the parties as governing appeals of permits and appeals from decisions of the director of Permits, Approvals and Inspections. The board additionally referenced United Parcel Service v. People’s Counsel, 336 Md. 569 (1994), as persuasive authority on the ability of neighbors to challenge the issuance of a permit in some circumstances.

The board’s order will reflect the panel’s deliberations and rationale to deny dismissal and will set procedural next steps to resolve whether the director’s determination concerning floodplain waiver requirements was correct.