Appellate panel weighs double‑jeopardy remedy and prior‑bad‑acts evidence in Rollins case

At an appellate oral argument, attorneys debated whether retrial of a defendant identified in the transcript as Mr. Rollins violated double jeopardy and whether testimony about an earlier uncharged sexual incident was admissible under Rule 404(b).

Miss Trent, the appellant’s counsel, argued the retrial was barred because a jury at the first trial had returned a not‑guilty finding on what the parties identified as count 1, and the defense contends the second trial therefore exposed the defendant to successive prosecutions for the same offense. Counsel said the double‑jeopardy question arose from the judge’s handling of the verdicts and the trial court’s subsequent entry of judgment for a lesser included offense rather than ordering a new trial.

The state, represented at argument by Davy Douglas, told the panel the trial court’s remedy was proper. Douglas cited the U.S. Supreme Court’s Morris v. Matthews and state cases to argue that when a later conviction of a greater offense necessarily establishes the elements of a lesser included offense, the court may enter judgment for the lesser offense rather than vacate and remand for a new trial. Douglas also told the court the apparent repeat prosecution resulted from an oversight rather than an intentional decision: “This was not, I think, how either party had intended this to proceed.”

Judges on the panel pressed both sides about prejudice and the record. One judge asked whether evidence of a completed sexual offense presented at the second trial would be prejudicial given a prior jury’s not‑guilty announcement on the related charge; the judge framed the concern as whether a subsequent jury could fairly consider testimony the first jury had rejected. The state responded that existing authority allows testimony of a completed act to prove attempt and that the trial court had followed Rule 404(b) procedures, held a jury‑out hearing, and found the evidence admissible and probative.

The transcript shows the first trial reached mixed outcomes: an acquittal on the principal charge identified as count 1, and a hung jury on the other counts (counts 2 and 3). At the second trial the jury convicted the defendant of the greater offense, and the trial judge then entered judgment of conviction for the lesser included offense (described in the record as attempted [offense]). Defense counsel argued that Rule 33’s limits on a trial court’s authority — either accept a jury verdict or order a new trial — mean that entry of judgment for the lesser offense in this posture runs afoul of double‑jeopardy protections when the defendant was previously acquitted on that charge.

On the admissibility issue, the contested evidence involved an earlier incident in which the state says the defendant exposed himself to the victim when the victim was about 3 or 4 years old. The state argued the testimony explained the victim’s delayed disclosure and bore on intent and credibility; the state cited Tennessee precedent that a completed offense may be used to prove attempt and referenced State v. Thorpe and other cases in support. The defense countered that introducing the prior act risked undue prejudice, particularly because the earlier not‑guilty finding could make the later jury’s consideration unfairly cumulative or inflammatory.

No decision was announced at the end of the argument. After the parties finished, the clerk called the next case, and the panel proceeded. The record and the judges’ questions indicate the court focused on (1) whether the trial court’s remedial entry of a lesser conviction is a permissible cure for a double‑jeopardy error given an earlier acquittal and (2) whether the trial court properly applied Rule 404(b) before admitting testimony about an earlier incident.