Court Hears Challenge to Felon‑in‑Possession Conviction Based on 2009 DUI; Preservation and Bruen Analysis Central

The Utah Court of Appeals heard arguments on whether a possession‑by‑a‑restricted‑person conviction tied to a 2009 felony DUI violates the Second Amendment under the framework that has emerged since New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn. v. Bruen.

Benjamin Miller, counsel for appellant Michael Caldwell, urged the panel to treat the case as an as‑applied challenge to disarmament based on a nonviolent felony. Miller said Bruen requires historical‑tradition analogues and argued felony DUI lacks an historical analogue that would support lifelong deprivation of arms. He told the court that categorical treatment of all felons is overbroad and highlighted circuit decisions that have found particular felonies not analogous to historical regulations.

“Those are the what they all veil of 1 way or another is 1, groups those groups of people weren't part of the people at the time,” Miller said, arguing the founding‑era analogies the state relies on do not match DUI.

The state, represented by Tanner Hafen (and additional state counsel appearing), focused first on preservation. Counsel argued the defendant had time after Bruen to raise the issue in trial court, sentencing, or a post‑trial motion and that the preservation rule — and the Johnson “procedural anomaly” standard — preclude the court from reaching the constitutional claim because it was not timely raised below. The state also argued Bruen and subsequent cases do not automatically invalidate felon‑in‑possession statutes and pointed to historical analogues (group disarmament, loyalty oaths and punishments) that it said support restrictions on particular classes.

The panel asked detailed questions about timing: Bruen was decided June 23, 2022, and the appellant’s trial and sentencing occurred within weeks thereafter. Judges probed whether six weeks before trial was enough time to preserve the issue and whether Bruen’s effect constituted the kind of rare procedural anomaly that justifies excusing preservation failures. Miller argued the short time frame and rapidly shifting precedent made preservation impractical and that the court should reach the merits; the state urged deference to preservation and constitutional avoidance.

Counsel debated the proper historical test under Bruen and later decisions (including Rahimi): whether the state must show a historical tradition allowing disarmament of people within a covered category and whether felony DUI qualifies as that kind of category given its public‑safety focus. Miller said DUI is qualitatively different from violent felonies and that the state had not identified a founding‑era tradition that would support a categorical lifelong deprivation. The state contended historical practice allowed disarmament of persons deemed disloyal or dangerous and argued felons fall within historically disarmed classes.

Counsel also discussed statutory mechanics cited in the record: the applicable restricted‑person statute under which the conviction proceeded, the 2009 prior felony relied on by the prosecution, and a later statutory modification (a seven‑year temporal restoration provision referenced in briefing but not controlling at the time of conviction). The court took argument and said it would take the matter under advisement and issue a written decision.