Court hears property dispute over historic railroad deed, abandonment and prescriptive easement claims

The Utah Court of Appeals heard argument in an ownership dispute over a narrow rail‑corridor parcel and adjoining commercial property, focusing on whether historical federal railroad grants and an 1874 deed to Union Pacific conveyed a full fee simple or a limited fee/easement with a reverter and whether subsequent acts or documents abandoned the right of way.

Ken Brown, representing the appellants, argued the 1874 transaction and later quitclaim conveyances demonstrate that Union Pacific (and its successors) held fee simple and that a later 2007 quitclaim to the appellees’ predecessor transferred the remaining interest. Brown pointed to chain‑of‑title issues across multiple parcels and disputed the trial court’s legal conclusion that railroads could not hold fee simple in the corridor at the time of the 1874 grant.

John Keider and appellees’ counsel urged affirmance of the trial court’s summary‑judgment dismissal of prescriptive easement claims. Appellees’ counsel argued the deed should be read in light of the federal railroad statutes and controlling Supreme Court precedent (Townsend and related decisions), which the appellees say recognizes that many 19th‑century railroad grants created only limited fees or easements with a reverter back to the United States when the grant was not used for railroad purposes. Appellees relied on an administrative record including a 1942 instrument referencing Southern Pacific’s abandonment of operations on the spur and on a 2007 quitclaim from Union Pacific reserving subsurface/mineral rights.

Why it matters: the panel must resolve whether the underlying interest was a fee simple that can be the subject of prescriptive claims or whether federal‑statute‑based limitations and the existence of a reverter or easement preclude the prescriptive claims. The decision will hinge on statutory interpretation of 19th‑century railroad grants, the content and legal effect of the 1874 deed, the legal effect of the 1942 operational abandonment notice, and the 2007 quitclaim conveyance.

Appellant counsel said the trial court erred as a matter of law by treating the 1874 deed and later conveyances as limited or subject to reverter; he cited federal Court of Claims decisions and the language of the Dudley Chase deed that “do hereby remise, release, and forever revise release and quitclaim to the Union Pacific Railroad Company.” Appellees’ counsel replied that Townsend and related precedent and the historical statutory scheme show the grant is limited and that the railroad’s rights were subject to reverter if not used for railroad purposes. Appellees further argued that the 1942 document and the lack of later ICC/STB abandonment filings point to an abandonment timeline and that the 2007 quitclaim clarified current title.

The panel questioned counsel about survey boundaries, the different chains of title for the narrow corridor versus adjacent parcels, the exact text of the 1874 deed, whether Union Pacific’s 1942 action abandoned operation or the underlying right of way, and whether federal regulatory procedure (ICC/STB abandonment filings) is necessary for an effective abandonment in this context. Counsel agreed the evidentiary record on abandonment and on the 1874 deed’s statutory source is incomplete in places; the Court took the matter under advisement.

The Court of Appeals will issue an opinion resolving whether prescriptive claims can stand and clarifying how historical railroad grants and subsequent conveyances affect modern property rights.