Utah Court of Appeals hears argument in Scofield v. Starbucks over business duty to protect outdoor patrons from vehicle collisions

Judge Ryan Tenney convened the Utah Court of Appeals and heard argument Thursday in Scofield v. Starbucks Corporation, a negligence case arising after a Dodge 1500 Ram truck struck a customer seated in Starbucks’ outdoor seating area. Appellate counsel for the Scofields asked the court to reverse the district court’s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6); counsel for Starbucks asked the court to affirm, arguing the complaint failed to allege the necessary factual showing that would give rise to a duty to protect against third‑party vehicular conduct.

The core dispute at argument was whether Utah precedent establishes a categorical duty that a business owes to invitees—such that a plaintiff need only plead a recognized duty to proceed—or whether foreseeability and other “just factors” must still be assessed at the duty stage. "When a recognized duty has been invoked, the just factors play no role in the analysis," counsel for the Scofields told the panel, urging that cases such as Jeffs and Davis support assessing duty at a broad, categorical level and leaving fact‑specific questions to breach and causation. Judge Tenney and the other judges repeatedly pressed counsel on the practical limits of that approach: would recognizing the Scofields’ reading require businesses with outdoor seating to install concrete barriers near every road or parking lot?

Starbucks’ counsel responded that Utah case law going back to Dwiggins and Gray requires a showing that the business "knows or has reason to know" third‑party acts are likely before a duty to act arises. Counsel warned that accepting the Scofields’ approach would erode that requirement and force defendants to develop evidence at the pleading stage. "In Dwiggins the court held the duty does not arise until the business owner knows or should know that the criminal acts are likely to occur," counsel said, arguing the complaint did not meet that minimum standard.

The argument also turned on procedural posture. Appellants stressed that on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true and draws reasonable inferences for the plaintiff; Starbucks stressed that at summary judgment the plaintiff must prove facts, and certain prior cases (including Dwiggins) were decided at the summary judgment stage. Counsel for the Scofields pointed to allegations that the truck traveled from Highland Drive across multiple lanes, jumped curbs and struck the outdoor seating area, and that Starbucks had prior experience with vehicle collisions at other locations; Starbucks replied that the record lacks an expert showing what protective measures would have prevented the collision or that a reasonable business would have employed such measures at this specific site.

Judges probed both sides on doctrinal coherence. Several judges asked whether older third‑party cases the parties cited (Dwiggins, Gray v. Scott, Wiggins/Morgan Jewelers) should be read as addressing duty or breach, and whether Sandy Mall/DW and Davis altered that line of authority. Counsel debated whether those precedents can be harmonized so duty remains categorical while foreseeability and remedies remain case‑specific. The court also noted disputed factual allegations in the complaint, including that the vehicle was a Dodge 1500 Ram truck traveling about 29 miles per hour and that the seating faced a busy roadway and parking lot.

No decision was announced. After hearing rebuttal, the panel said it would take the case under advisement and "do our best to issue a decision as soon as we reasonably can."