Appeals court weighs whether district court erred by treating trial-day stipulation as binding in home valuation

At oral argument in Dutcher v. Dutcher before the Utah Court of Appeals, Taylor Webb, counsel for appellant David Dutcher, told the court the district court erred by refusing to value the marital home “at the time of the decree” and instead relied on a prior trial-day stipulation to keep an earlier valuation.

Webb argued that “the general principle, the general rule is that the district court is required to value the marital estate at the time of the decree,” and that the trial court gave no adequate reason — other than the parties’ earlier stipulation — for applying an older valuation only to the home while updating other assets. Webb said the stipulation was an informal, trial‑management agreement that did not bind the court at a later set of trial dates, and that the parties and the court treated other updated valuations as admissible at the later trial without objection.

The issue matters, Webb told the court, because the updated valuations reflect substantial intervening changes; she said an offhand trial‑day agreement to avoid calling an appraiser is not equivalent to a permanent waiver of the right to seek an updated valuation. When a panel member asked whether the record showed David had formally moved to set aside the stipulation, Webb responded that he raised the point in a post‑trial motion and that the parties’ conduct during the second trial dates -- including admission of updated valuations for other assets without objection -- showed no party treated the stipulation as permanently binding.

Harry Kasten, counsel for the appellee, told the court the stipulation was read into the record and should be enforced. Kasten pressed that offering a different appraisal at the second phase of trial effectively signaled that the party had abandoned the original valuation and, if a party intended to withdraw or change a stipulation, the correct procedure was to file a motion during the intervening period. Kasten argued that the record was “devoid” of any indication the stipulation was merely a passing, informal arrangement.

Judges on the panel questioned both sides about who was responsible for the six‑month interval between trial segments and whether that delay affected the equities. Webb attributed the need for a rebuttal expert to a last‑minute change in a custody evaluator’s report and said calendar availability for court and opposing counsel contributed to the delay; she emphasized that a delay alone does not make a stipulation binding for all future purposes. Kasten responded that counsel could and should have moved to set aside the stipulation in the months between trial dates, and said entering competing evidence without objecting during the bench trial did not relieve the parties from the consequences of the on‑the‑record stipulation.

The court did not announce a decision at the argument. The panel took the matter under advisement and said it would issue a written decision resolving the appeal.

The argument focused on two legal questions: (1) the proper interpretation and legal effect of a party stipulation entered on the record at the outset of trial, and (2) whether the district court abused its discretion by relying on that stipulation when it updated values for other assets but not for the marital home. No final appellate ruling was read from the bench.