Vermont committee hears testimony on H.223 to address device-enabled stalking and vehicle access for survivors

The House Judiciary Committee continued hearings on H.223 on Feb. 20, hearing testimony from advocates, a survivor and prosecutors about proposed protections for device-enabled stalking and for survivors’ access to vehicles. Testimony supported adding vehicle access to civil protection orders and updating stalking definitions to reflect continuous digital surveillance, while prosecutors and others warned against creating a broad new standalone criminal offense without more work.

Supporters, including Charlie Glisserman, policy director at the Vermont Network Against Domestic and Sexual Violence, told the committee that “as technology evolves, our laws must also evolve to respond to new risks, and introduce new safeguards to protect survivors’ safety and privacy.” Glisserman highlighted three components of H.223: requiring automakers to allow a driver to remove another person’s remote access to a connected vehicle; explicitly authorizing courts to award primary possession of a vehicle in civil protection orders; and updating the stalking definition to better capture device-enabled surveillance.

The bill would add vehicle-related protections because, supporters said, a car can be a lifeline for survivors who need to flee, maintain employment and access childcare in rural areas. “A vehicle can be a lifeline for survivors in escaping violence and leaving independent lives immediately afterwards,” Glisserman said, and advocates noted New York and California have recently adopted similar safeguards for connected cars.

Survivor and trainer Anna Nascent of Waitsfield described long-term technology-enabled stalking in her own case and urged lawmakers to act. “It is critical that survivors of technology-facilitated abuse can access protective measures they need to live their lives free from violence,” Nascent said, citing national surveys and SPARK research that estimate millions of people are stalked yearly and that many victims experience tracking by electronic devices or apps.

On the civil/procedural question, advocates and several law-enforcement representatives urged placing the updated stalking definition in the civil protection-order statutes (Title 12) rather than only amending the criminal stalking definition in Title 13. Glisserman recommended the committee “consider updating the civil stalking definition in the 12 V.S.A. section,” arguing survivors most often seek civil relief and have encountered difficulty applying a criminal-style “course of conduct” standard to continuous device surveillance.

Prosecutors represented by a Marshall (identified in testimony as a Department of State’s Attorneys office representative) said their office does not handle civil protection-order applications but that violations of those orders are among the most common crimes seen in Vermont criminal courts. That office expressed substantive concerns about the bill’s separate criminal offense for ‘‘placing or using an electronic tracking app on a person's vehicle without their consent.’’ Marshall said a standalone criminal statute could sweep in conduct that ordinary Vermonters might not recognize as criminal and noted enforcement would raise practical issues, such as proving consent by all occupants and encountering tracking devices left active from prior loans or leases on used vehicles.

Prosecutors and other panelists flagged several practical and legal questions for the committee: how to define consent when vehicles have multiple occupants; how to handle used cars that retain previously installed active trackers; cross-jurisdictional problems when a tracker is operated from another state; and the law-enforcement costs of subpoenaing technology companies for device or account data. The Department of State’s Attorneys noted that existing criminal statutes (for example, the computer-crimes statute cited in testimony, 13 V.S.A. § 4102) may already cover some unauthorized access to accounts or devices.

Committee members raised narrower policy options, such as removing the bill’s requirement that “all occupants” be informed to allow an owner to track a car they reasonably believe they own or have the right to monitor, or adopting a “should have known” consent standard rather than strict proof that all occupants consent. Prosecutors suggested these are policy choices the committee should weigh alongside resource and prosecutorial concerns.

Witnesses also discussed evidence and enforcement topics: prosecutors and defense counsel described the use of device-provider records, phone data dumps and geofence/location records to establish proximity and tracking; panelists said courts already can consider geolocation and device-tracking data as evidence when relevant to proving violations of protection orders or criminal offenses. Several participants noted that geolocation tools (for example, “Find My,” AirTags and similar devices) can both aid and endanger victims depending on how the devices are used and who controls the account.

Committee members said they will continue to gather information. The committee scheduled additional witnesses and paperwork and may ask the bill sponsors and stakeholders to return with suggested changes. No formal vote was recorded at the Feb. 20 hearing.

For now the committee’s choices center on three items: whether to (1) locate the revised stalking definition in the civil protection-order statutes to ensure survivors can obtain relief; (2) keep, alter or remove the proposed standalone criminal offense for vehicle tracking; and (3) clarify consent and exception language for owners, occupants and commercial uses (for example, repossession or dealer tracking). Lawmakers and witnesses repeatedly emphasized the technical complexity of evidence and the need for additional consultation with prosecutors, defenders and victim advocates before drafting final statutory language.

The Judiciary Committee said it will reconvene with more testimony and possible technical edits; additional witnesses were scheduled for the next meeting.