Texas Supreme Court weighs whether lease and later events defeated notice challenge to tax-foreclosure deed

The Supreme Court of Texas heard arguments in Thompson v. Landry about whether a property owner had adequate notice of a tax-foreclosure proceeding and whether later acts — including a lease and eviction — preclude a collateral attack on the resulting sheriff's deed.

The dispute centers on when May Landry learned she no longer owned the property and which legal remedies she could have pursued. "The lease does put a put, from my perspective, it puts actual notice on them about the the existence of the default judgment," said Mister Hootman, counsel for the petitioners, arguing that the lease and other facts triggered limitations periods under the tax code and defeated a later due-process challenge.

Why it matters: If the court accepts the petitioners' view, purchasers at tax sales will have stronger protections against late challenges; if it accepts the respondents' view, property owners who were not personally served may preserve equitable or collateral remedies. "The fundamental issue in this appeal is whether May Landry, and I'm gonna paren Mitchell, because this tracks the Mitchell case almost exactly," said Miss Elizalde, counsel for the respondent, invoking precedent the parties disputed.

Central legal points and factual claims

- Statutory limitations. Counsel discussed two statutory remedies from the tax code: a two-year statutory right to sue under Chapter 33 measured from execution of the deed, and a two-year right to redeem under Chapter 34 measured from filing of the deed. Petitioners argued those two-year periods would have been available once the deed or record notice was effective.

- Lease date and timing. Counsel disputed the lease date. Petitioners' counsel at times referred to a lease signed earlier; respondent counsel said the lease in the record "clearly states that it was August 2009, not '2 thousand and '8." The date affects whether limitations periods had already run before respondent learned of the sale or default.

- Actual notice versus constructive/statutory notice. Petitioners argued the lease and other circumstances gave actual or at least inquiry notice so that due-process protections did not bar enforcement; respondents denied actual notice, contending May Landry testified she did not know of the lease and first learned the full scope of the events during eviction proceedings in late 2015 and early 2016.

- Restatement §66, laches and finality. Petitioners relied on the Restatement (Second) of Judgments §66 (equitable limits on relief against a voidable judgment) and argued equity should bar late collateral attacks where purchasers relied on the sheriff's deed. Respondents emphasized precedent (including Mitchell and Mennonite and U.S. Supreme Court due-process authorities) and contended procedural defects and lack of personal citation left the judgment void for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Key factual highlights mentioned in argument

- The Thompsons purchased approximately a 12-acre tract for $2,900, according to argument. - Eviction proceedings occurred in late 2015; the county-level appeals and related proceedings brought the matter to court records in early 2016; one party said the suit in this case was filed in February 2016. - Counsel for respondents said the record contains multiple tax renditions and that an ad litem was appointed but "didn't even do his job. Didn't even go to the property," said Mister Kirkpatrick, counsel for the respondent.

Positions from counsel

- Petitioners (Mister Hootman) argued that the lease and the totality of circumstances put owners on inquiry/actual notice, would have given them time to assert statutory remedies, and that equitable doctrines like Restatement §66 could bar a late attack on a long-final sheriff's deed.

- Respondents (Miss Elizalde and Mister Kirkpatrick) argued the record shows a lack of personal service and direct notice to May Landry, that the lease in the record is dated August 2009 (not 2008), and that Landry testified she did not know about the lease until eviction proceedings. "I've been dealing with this case for at least 8 years and I've never seen something so appalling as a petitioner not even trying to comply with the rules," Kirkpatrick told the court.

Court process and next steps

Justices questioned counsel about distinctions between personal-jurisdiction and subject-matter defects, the interplay of federal due-process principles with Texas service rules, and whether equitable considerations like laches or reliance interests should protect purchasers who relied on the sheriff's deed. The court took the case under submission after argument and announced a brief recess.

Ending

The court recessed after oral argument and submitted the case for decision; no ruling was announced from the bench.