Lab directors tell Congress they follow DOE security orders; report no contact from 'DOGE' and outline foreign national safeguards

WASHINGTON — Directors of the Department of Energy's national laboratories told the House subcommittee they have not been contacted by the so‑called Department of Government Efficiency ("DOGE") and said their operations adhere to DOE orders and contract requirements that govern security and foreign‑national access.

Tom Mason, director of Los Alamos National Laboratory, told the committee: "No contact at Los Alamos." Paul Kearns, director of Argonne National Laboratory, said: "No, there's been no contact at Argonne." John Wagner said the same for Idaho National Laboratory. Witnesses described layered safeguards: segregated classified research, managed research environments, screening and vetting processes for foreign nationals and contracting provisions that require compliance with DOE security orders.

Members pressed witnesses about numbers of foreign nationals at labs and past espionage incidents. Wagner said Idaho National Laboratory had "approximately 50 foreign nationals from China." Mason said Los Alamos had "about 100" citizens of countries of risk (China, Russia, North Korea and Iran) out of about 18,000 total employees and that the lab was working to comply with recent National Defense Authorization Act language by its compliance deadline. Budil said Lawrence Livermore had "just short of 60" Chinese citizens who were not permanent residents. Kearns said Argonne had "just short of a thousand" foreign nationals and that "a few hundred" of those are from the People's Republic of China.

Committee members asked how labs would respond if an external party sought access to proprietary or classified systems. Witnesses said they follow DOE orders and contractual obligations; Mason and others said changes that forego required security checks would require contracting‑officer direction and departmental orders. Kearns summarized the contractual posture: labs operate as contractors under DOE orders embedded in their contracts and are required to comply with those orders until and unless they are changed.

Members also raised historical espionage cases but directors said there were no confirmed recent espionage incidents tied to currently employed foreign nationals. Directors described managed research environments and screening procedures used to limit foreign‑national access to sensitive facilities and networks. The hearing record includes requests from members for written details about lab‑specific foreign‑national counts and security controls.