House Homeland Security subcommittee warns of security risks from Chinese investments in Western Hemisphere ports

At a House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security hearing, members and witnesses described Chinese state-linked firms’ expanding role in port infrastructure across the Western Hemisphere as a potential threat to U.S. homeland security, citing surveillance, cyber vulnerabilities and the Panama Canal’s strategic importance.

Witnesses and lawmakers said the risks included the potential for intelligence collection through equipment and software at ports, disruption or denial of access in a crisis, and facilitation of illicit flows such as precursor chemicals used to make fentanyl. They urged expanded U.S. investment, stricter cybersecurity and screening, and multilateral commercial diplomacy to offer alternatives to Chinese financing.

The hearing opened with Chairman Jimenez saying the session would examine “The People’s Republic Of China’s strategic investments in ports across the Western Hemisphere, including The United States and near the Panama Canal and their broader implications for homeland security.” He warned that Panama and other regional ports give Beijing strategic positions and said, “We do we don't need an audit. We need action.”

Dr. Isaac Carden, senior fellow for China studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, told the subcommittee Chinese companies have stakes in terminals in the hemisphere and noted a pattern of joint ventures and equipment procurement that can leave U.S. ports reliant on PRC-made systems. Carden said Chinese firms have invested in port terminals in seven countries in the hemisphere and hold minority stakes at terminals in several U.S. ports. He advised against “indiscriminate forced divestiture,” instead urging mandatory cybersecurity and other security screenings, development of domestic alternatives, closer cooperation with Panama, and use of allied partners to compete.

Dr. Matthew Kroenig, vice president and senior director at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council, described the PRC’s port investments as part of a broader strategic competition and urged the United States and partners to “derisk” — decouple from PRC control in sectors critical to national security — while offering alternatives. Kroenig said Panama’s decision to audit concessions presents an opportunity to rebid certain contracts to U.S. or allied firms.

Dr. Ryan Berg of the Center for Strategic and International Studies recommended a spectrum-of-concern methodology for evaluating port-related risks, targeted financial tools such as a Development Finance Corporation–backed port buyback program, and sustained commercial diplomacy to present viable alternatives to Chinese offers.

Akari Davis, president and CEO of the American Association of Port Authorities, emphasized the economic scale of U.S. ports and the industry’s interest in security. He cited a recent industry figure that U.S. ports generate roughly $2,900,000,000,000 in economic activity and support about 22,000,000 jobs and noted the bipartisan Infrastructure Law’s Port Infrastructure Development Program, which the witness said provides $450,000,000 annually in funding (FY2022–FY2026). Davis and other witnesses called for stronger investment in domestic cargo-handling equipment production and better information-sharing among port operators and federal agencies on cyber threats.

Several members highlighted specific concerns: Chairman Jimenez and panelists raised the Panama Canal’s outsized role in U.S. seaborne trade (Carden testified that approximately 14% of U.S. seaborne trade and about 40% of U.S. container traffic transit the canal) and questioned whether Chinese-managed terminals adjacent to the canal could be used for dual-use activities. Witnesses responded that while large-scale PLA naval operations in the hemisphere have been limited historically, commercial ports and embedded equipment can be dual-use and merit close scrutiny.

Ranking Member MacIver urged maintaining U.S. foreign-aid tools to counter PRC influence and warned against dismantling USAID, saying, “Dismantling US aid is illegal.” Other members from both parties pressed witnesses on practical responses: strengthening port security grants and infrastructure funding, accelerating domestic manufacture or trusted sourcing of cranes and other equipment, and improving commercial diplomacy to provide realistic alternatives to Chinese financing.

On cybersecurity, witnesses and industry representatives described regular cooperation with federal agencies (including CISA and the U.S. Coast Guard) and industry threat-sharing forums (ISACs). Davis said industry and government have successfully identified high-risk software or equipment and prevented its adoption in U.S. systems in some cases. Witnesses recommended mandatory cybersecurity standards, supply-chain risk mitigation, and more robust U.S. and allied offers to ports in the region.

Panelists made several policy recommendations rather than proposing immediate legislative votes at the hearing: stricter security and cybersecurity screening for port equipment and operators; targeted use of development finance and allied cooperation to buy back or rebid sensitive port concessions; a coordinated U.S. maritime strategy (including previously proposed measures such as the Ships for America bill and a maritime security advisor); and ramped-up commercial diplomacy and financing alternatives through the DFC and allied partners.

The hearing record will be open for additional questions; Chairman Jimenez closed the hearing after asking the witnesses to answer follow-up questions in writing and noting that “the hearing record will be open for 10 days.”