SJC hears dispute over whether Uniform Anatomical Gift Act shields Harvard from morgue misconduct claims

Jeffrey Catalano, attorney for the plaintiffs, told the Supreme Judicial Court during oral argument that the trial court’s dismissal should be reversed because the plaintiffs were denied discovery and because the UAGA “is silent with regard to anything related to what happens in the morgue.”

Catalano told the justices the complaints allege persistent, repeated misconduct by a Harvard employee, morgue manager Cedric Lodge, over about five years and that the plaintiffs should be allowed to develop facts in discovery that plausibly show institutional accountability. He argued the UAGA governs the donative or transactional aspects of anatomical gifts, not the handling, storage, labeling or security of remains, and that if the statute did apply the admitted bad faith of the morgue manager would be imputed to Harvard under UAGA principles and the case law the parties cite.

Marty Murphy, counsel for Harvard and for employees Mark Cicchetti and Tracy Fay, urged the court to affirm the superior court’s dismissal. Murphy said the complaints, taken together, alleged at most negligent supervision and “conclusory allegations without facts” rather than the kind of bad faith the statute and precedent require to defeat immunity. Murphy and Harvard contend the UAGA was intended to govern the entire donation process and that the complaints fail to allege facts plausibly showing that Harvard or the named supervisors acted in bad faith distinct from Lodge’s alleged criminal conduct.

During questioning, Chief Justice Budd and Associate Justice Kepher pressed both sides on statutory text and policy. The court examined UAGA provisions that permit cremation, burial or funeral use and asked whether that language implies coverage of storage, security and post-donation handling. Justice Kepher expressed concern about the policy outcome if an institution that receives donated bodies could escape liability when an employee’s conduct is “egregious,” asking how donors and families would be reassured.

Plaintiffs’ counsel pointed to facts lodged in the record attachments that they say support discovery: a summary report referring to cameras at every entrance and electronic entry records, an allegation that Lodge transported items in duffel bags and displayed a license plate reading “GrimReaper,” and that Lodge had been suspended twice. Defense counsel responded that these allegations better support claims of negligent supervision and that Massachusetts decisions construing the UAGA require more specific proof of bad faith to overcome statutory immunity.

Both sides cited state and appellate decisions that, they said, guide whether and when employee misconduct is attributable to an institution for purposes of defeating UAGA immunity. Counsel debated whether a showing of “peculiarly pervasive noncompliance” or intentional misrepresentations (as in cases the parties cited) is necessary. The defense pointed to vicarious-liability principles and cases in which courts found the employee’s illicit acts were outside the scope of employment and therefore not attributable to the employer.

The court did not issue a ruling at argument. Several justices signaled concern about both the textual reach of the UAGA and the policy consequences of insulating institutions from liability for egregious employee misconduct. The case will be decided on briefs and submitted materials; no opinion was announced from the bench.