SJC hears arguments over standard for religious objections to vaccination of children in DCF temporary custody

At an oral argument before the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, attorneys debated what standard judges should apply when parents object on sincere religious grounds to routine medical care, including vaccinations, for children placed in temporary custody of the Department of Children and Families.

Attorney Kyla Clay, representing the mother, told the justices, “We’re here today because there’s a gap in the law concerning the appropriate standard of review that juvenile courts should apply when a parent objects on sincere religious grounds to routine, non urgent medical care of their child in temporary state custody.” Clay argued that because parents retain constitutional rights under the First Amendment, a parent’s religious objection should receive greater deference than ordinary challenges to DCF custodial decisions and proposed either a strict-scrutiny approach or a balancing test that weighs parental, child and state interests.

Attorney Laura Openshaw, representing the father, said she “share[s] the counsel for the mother's view” and emphasized that the difference between a temporary-custody finding made by a preponderance of the evidence and an adjudication of unfitness by clear and convincing evidence matters to how courts should weigh parental rights.

Kristen Braithwaite, counsel for the Department of Children and Families, urged the court to uphold the juvenile court’s decision allowing vaccinations and argued that the proper framework is the child’s best-interest test. Braithwaite said the temporary-custody finding gives the department authority under General Laws c. 119, § 21, to make decisions about a child’s housing, education and medical care and that those parental rights are circumscribed while a child is removed to protect against imminent risk of serious abuse or neglect.

Jean Kaiser, representing the child, asked the court to affirm the trial court’s authorization of vaccinations and stated plainly, “Strict scrutiny does not apply in this case.” Kaiser argued that vaccination and routine medical care are standard protective measures for the child and that the juvenile court had appropriately weighed the child’s interest in protection from preventable disease.

Justices questioned counsel on several recurring factual and legal points: why three siblings in the same family previously were not vaccinated while the subject child was; whether the Fulton line of cases or Lukumi would affect analysis; whether a balancing test would permit inconsistent discretionary exemptions by DCF; and how the “least restrictive means” prong would apply if strict scrutiny were used. Counsel acknowledged that the record did not explain why DCF treated the children differently and suggested the trial court’s record lacked a child‑specific analysis explaining the decision for this particular child. Clay urged the court to remedy that evidentiary gap, saying the trial judge failed “to conduct an inquiry into the child's specific circumstances.”

Counsel on all sides referenced state statutory authority and several precedents. Advocates for the parents cited the principle in Santosky v. Kramer that certain parental rights are fundamental and not wholly extinguished when the state assumes temporary custody; Braithwaite pointed to Massachusetts cases and statutes that limit parental rights when removal is necessary to protect a child; and counsel discussed federal precedents including Prince v. Massachusetts and Wisconsin v. Yoder in arguing how religious liberty claims intersect with child-protection powers.

The arguments centered on two related questions: whether a parent's sincere religious objection to routine vaccinations while a child is in temporary custody should receive heightened constitutional protection (strict scrutiny or Fulton-style scrutiny), or whether juvenile courts should apply the usual best-interest or balancing framework that guided the trial court. Counsel and the justices repeatedly returned to the practical implications of either rule, including whether routine medical decisions would be repeatedly deferred to parents whose custodial rights are attenuated by temporary removal.

The transcript does not record a decision from the court; the matter proceeded on argument.