Supreme Judicial Court Hears Appeal Over Two‑Year Suspension of Veterinarian Following Client Email on Ozone Therapy

The Supreme Judicial Court on oral argument considered whether a March 16, 2020 client email from Dr. Margo Roman constituted practicing beyond the scope of a veterinary license and whether the Board of Registration in Veterinary Medicine overstepped in suspending her license for two years.

Attorney Martha Coakley, representing Dr. Roman, told the court that “we asked this court to find for Doctor Roman on this appeal and restore her license.” Coakley argued that the single email was general health advice, not one of the specific acts that Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 112, § 58 lists as “practicing” (diagnosing, treating, prescribing, operating on, etc.), and therefore could not justify the board’s finding that Roman practiced beyond her authorized scope. Coakley urged the court to consider statutory construction of both § 58 and the disciplinary statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 112, § 61(1), and said the board’s two‑year suspension was excessive and punitive given the record: “the board has demonstrated, whether they intended to or not, their real intent to silence her for the content of a statement that she made.”

Assistant Attorney General Grace Gohlke, representing the board, responded that the March 16 email was a targeted clinic communication “sent from the clinic’s email to her client list to facilitate her treatment and care of her animal patients.” Gohlke said portions of the email that advised or recommended ozone therapy for humans fell outside the scope of veterinary practice and supported the board’s liability finding. She told the court the board had exercised its statutory discretion and that the sanction accounted for aggravating facts and a history of prior, progressive disciplinary matters.

During questioning, several justices pressed on how to draw a line between permissible general guidance and out‑of‑scope medical advice. One justice noted a content‑based concern, asking whether a vet could safely repeat government public‑health guidance (for example, to “wear a mask”) without disciplinary exposure while advocacy of a novel therapy might cross the line. Gohlke and the justices also discussed guardrails the board uses—whether targeted communications to existing clients differ from generic website statements and whether a referral link or a dealer recommendation in the email supported the board’s finding that the communication was part of a professional practice. The board’s final decision, the attorneys said, recognized mitigating factors including no evidence of bad intent and no evidence anyone followed the advice.

Coakley emphasized statutory limits on what counts as practicing, arguing that “directly or indirectly” in § 58 should be read to cover supervising or performing listed acts, not to reach any general statement a licensee makes outside a patient relationship. Gohlke countered that the board must preserve clear boundaries between veterinary practice and advice on human health when provided in a professional, client‑directed context.

The appeal challenges both the board’s liability finding that Dr. Roman practiced beyond the scope of her license and the severity of its sanction. The board previously imposed a two‑year suspension; the record discussed at argument also reflects earlier progressive discipline (fines and probation) that the board said informed its sanctioning decision. Counsel for Roman asked the court to set aside the suspension and restore her license; the board asked the court to affirm the single‑justice ruling and dismiss the petition.

The court heard argument from both sides and posed several questions about the statutory standard and the role of content in disciplinary determinations. A final decision by the Supreme Judicial Court had not been announced at the end of the argument.