House aviation subcommittee hears bipartisan push to speed counter‑drone rules, expand airport detection and mitigation
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At a House Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee on Aviation hearing, lawmakers, industry and academic witnesses urged faster FAA rulemaking and clearer authorities to detect and mitigate unauthorized drones as UAS use grows.
At a House Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee on Aviation hearing, lawmakers and industry and academic witnesses discussed gaps in U.S. authority and technology for detecting and mitigating unauthorized unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), commonly called drones, and urged faster FAA rulemaking and clearer, federally coordinated authority for local responses.
Chairman Nells opened the hearing by thanking investigators and first responders in two recent fatal aviation accidents and by turning to the day’s topic: “Unmanned aircraft systems, UAS, also known as drones, are extremely popular among the American people. So much so that there are more than 1,000,000 drones registered with the FAA,” he said. He and members of both parties described rapid growth in drone use and repeated examples in which airports and federal partners confronted undocumented or confusing UAS activity.
The subcommittee’s witnesses detailed three linked problems: (1) how to detect and identify drones reliably; (2) how to mitigate dangerous or unlawful flights without harming people, property or other aircraft; and (3) how to speed testing, approvals and training so mitigation tools can be used safely.
“UAS are aircraft and have the same protections as manned aircraft,” said Cathy Cahill, director of the Alaska Center for Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration at the University of Alaska Fairbanks, summing up a legal foundation that restricts who may interfere with flight. Cahill warned that many mitigation techniques raise multiple federal legal issues and said the existing authority to conduct counter‑UAS (CUAS) mitigation has been limited to a handful of federal entities: “Department of Defense, Department of Energy, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, and the FAA.”
Cahill and other witnesses urged Congress to preserve safety while expanding testing. Cahill noted that the FAA reauthorization law of 2024 allowed the seven FAA test sites to support CUAS testing but did not give them mitigation authority. She said that limitation is driving some companies to test overseas and that allowing testing against the kinds of drones commonly used in the U.S. — including covered foreign‑manufactured models — is necessary to tune detection systems.
Lisa Ellman, executive director of the Commercial Drone Alliance, stressed that industry already supports technical transparency and said a major, underused tool is remote identification. “Virtually all drones are now required to broadcast a digital license plate number accessible to the public with a smartphone app,” she testified, and she called for public education and better compliance enforcement so authorized flights can be distinguished from unlawful operations.
Chris McLaughlin, executive vice president of operations for Dallas Fort Worth International Airport, described how a large airport uses detection technology in day‑to‑day operations and the limits of that approach. “Our detection system has been effective identifying thousands of legitimate flights in our 5 mile radius annually and flagging about a 50 that were operated inappropriately,” McLaughlin said. He added that airports lack automated, real‑time access to FAA authorization data, making it harder to tell which detected UAS are authorized.
Members pressed witnesses on mitigation technologies, which fall into two broad categories: kinetic (nets, projectiles, lasers) and non‑kinetic (jamming, spoofing, cyber seizure). Cahill cautioned that non‑kinetic options can run afoul of statutes such as certain provisions of Title 18 (the wiretap and pen‑trap statutes and computer fraud and abuse act) unless relief is provided: “The non kinetic solutions potentially violate several sections of title 18, including the pen trap statute, the wire tap act and the computer fraud and abuse act,” she said.
Lawmakers pressed for faster action from the FAA and the White House interagency process on two pending rulemakings repeatedly discussed at the hearing: the so‑called Part 108 rule (to enable more routine beyond‑visual‑line‑of‑sight commercial operations and improved low‑altitude airspace awareness) and the longstanding rule implementing 49 U.S.C. § 2209 (a statutory framework, first mandated in 2016, to allow fixed‑site facilities to limit drone operations over certain sensitive sites). Ellman said both rules are “ready to go” but stalled in interagency review, and multiple members urged congressional oversight and deadlines.
Several members and witnesses supported a narrowly scoped expansion of mitigation authorities via pilot programs. McLaughlin said airports with trained law enforcement and federal oversight could serve as force multipliers for federal agencies if given limited, well‑tested mitigation authority: “State and local law enforcement agencies with advanced capabilities are better positioned physically to respond to drone incidents near airports,” he said, while emphasizing the federal government should retain overall leadership.
Members also discussed practical barriers to deployment: cost, continued staffing needs to monitor 24/7 systems, and the need for consistent training. The chair demonstrated a handheld radio‑frequency jammer called a “drone defender,” noting the manufacturer’s price: “this is about $50,000,” he said, and asked witnesses why such devices are not more widely deployed. Witnesses replied that testing, safety approvals and legal clarity are prerequisites to widespread deployment and that jamming carries the risk of unintended interference with other systems if not properly vetted.
Throughout the hearing lawmakers cautioned against premature conclusions about unrelated aviation accidents, saying investigators such as the NTSB should complete their work. No legislation was enacted at the hearing; the session was a fact‑finding hearing and the committee left the record open for additional submissions and follow‑up.
What happens next: witnesses and members urged Congress and the administration to finish the FAA rulemakings (Part 108 and the 2209 rule), to fund and staff FAA offices that implement UAS oversight, to expand authorized test sites and to create narrowly limited pilot programs that allow vetted local entities and airports to use tested mitigation tools with federal oversight and accountability. Several members also emphasized public education about remote identification as a near‑term step to reduce false alarms and improve enforcement.
A hearing record request noted by the chair will include witnesses’ full written statements; the subcommittee asked that the record remain open for 15 days to accept additional materials from members and witnesses.
