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Election‑security bill draws split testimony: proponents cite vulnerabilities, state and counties warn of impractical requirements
Summary
Supporters urged stricter certification and updates for voting systems; the secretary of state's office and county auditors warned the bill conflicts with certification processes, is unworkable on timelines, and would undermine existing testing and audits.
House Bill 1587, described by sponsor Representative Niko Rios as an "election security" and "election integrity" bill, drew sharply divided testimony in the Government and Veterans Affairs Committee.
Rios introduced the measure as a set of additional safeguards for voting systems and then yielded technical questions to Rick Weibley, an IT security consultant who said he has performed election investigations in multiple states. Weibley testified that current voting systems do not meet modern security expectations, raised concerns about outdated operating systems and antivirus protection on some equipment, and described procedures he said introduce risk — for example, county staff using a workstation to download election definition files onto a USB drive which is then used to update tabulators. "You need to ask, why is ES&S not mailing the thumb drives directly to the counties ... You should not be relying on any county machine or outside machine connected to the Internet to download it and then update the election equipment," Weibley testified.
Erica White, state election director in the Secretary of State's office, opposed the bill and disputed several technical assertions. White said North Dakota's tabulation systems are certified to VVSG 1 or 1.1 and that no equipment currently certified to VVSG 2 is available for purchase; the EAC process for VVSG 2 certification is ongoing and expected to take months or years. She said equipment in North Dakota is not connected to the Internet and does not support "modoming," that drives used on tabulators do not touch networked machines, and that county auditors perform logic and accuracy tests and public tests before each election. "This bill is in direct conflict with our effort to keep North Dakota election secure by undermining our certification and testing, and I urge a do not pass on 1587," White said.
County officials and auditors echoed concerns about feasibility. Brandy Madriga, finance director for Cass County, said moving the public test from one week before election day to 60 days prior is infeasible because candidate filing deadlines and ballot programming timelines occur within that window; she also said the county's post‑election recounts and audits have confirmed tabulation accuracy. "During the 2024 general election, Cass County processed over 91,000 ballots," Madriga said, noting multiple ballot styles and races and explaining the staff time required for incumbent post‑election duties.
Danelle Presky of the North Dakota Association of Counties and the County Auditors Association told the committee North Dakota's audit results and security posture were strong and that the bill's sweeping changes would be disruptive.
Ending: The committee heard extensive technical and operational testimony and then closed the public hearing; no committee vote on HB 1587 is recorded in the transcript excerpt.
