Panel reviews mixed‑verdict domestic‑violence appeal that raised new standard for ‘threat’ element

Commonwealth v. Cole Tullian (docket 24P312) was argued Feb. 6 before the Appeals Court panel, centering on multiple convictions from a domestic‑violence prosecution and on how recent legal developments affect the element of subjective intent for a criminal threat.

Defense counsel Suzanne Renault focused on the narrow factual record, arguing several acquittals and the limited duration of the interaction undercut the Commonwealth’s broader theory of a pattern of intimidation. Renault told the court the facts did not show the long‑standing, coercive relationship courts rely on in decisions such as Gardner and Ballard; rather, Renault said the record contained a discrete set of episodes (vehicle pursuit, texts and an earlier incident) that did not establish a pervasive pattern of domination or lawful grounds to infer the subjective intent required for a threat conviction under recent caselaw.

The Commonwealth, represented by ADA Megan Monahan with trial prosecutor Sean Riley at counsel table, responded that the evidence taken as a whole sustained the verdicts. The prosecutor emphasized the gravity of the charged conduct: an 18‑minute high‑speed pursuit in which the defendant’s vehicle repeatedly struck the victim’s car, testimony that the defendant said “today is the last day for me to kill you,” and other conduct the Commonwealth said showed deliberate, menacing behavior and use of the vehicle as a dangerous weapon.

A central legal question raised by the court’s questioning was how recent Supreme Court and state rulings—addressing the “threat” element and requiring proof of a subjective mental state in some formulations—affect convictions based on spoken statements plus surrounding conduct. The prosecutor relied on the fact that the jury found guilty the dangerous‑weapon assault charge to bolster the Commonwealth’s position that the same facts supported the threat conviction. Defense counsel urged that the issue required reversal or remand: if the law now requires explicit proof of a defendant’s subjective recklessness about whether his words would be understood as a threat, the present record may not satisfy that standard.

The panel also examined the record on the alleged offer to provide a $2,900 tax benefit as an asserted bribe and whether the defendant had the ability to deliver that benefit—a factual and legal dispute the defense argued made the bribery/witness‑intimidation theory legally deficient under Bellard‑type analysis. Counsel clashed over whether the text messages and subsequent conduct could be read as a genuine attempt to influence the victim’s testimony or were implausible attempts that did not reach the level of an offer that could be carried out.

The court took the arguments under advisement.