SJC considers whether RMV administrative suspension triggers enhanced penalty for driving with suspended license

The Supreme Judicial Court heard argument in Commonwealth v. William C. Foley over whether a Registry of Motor Vehicles administrative suspension, imposed separately from a court-ordered criminal suspension, can trigger the enhanced penalty in the third paragraph of Chapter 90, Section 23 when a defendant drives after the suspension.

The question matters because the third paragraph carries an enhanced statutory penalty (counsel said it includes a mandatory minimum jail term) that applies only after a driver’s license is suspended “pursuant to” one of a set of enumerated offenses and before the “restoration of such license or right to drive.” If an RMV administrative suspension imposed under a different statutory provision applies, the defendant’s counsel said the enhanced penalty should not attach.

Erin Opperman, attorney for defendant-appellant William C. Foley, told the court the record shows Foley’s criminal conviction produced a 10-year court-ordered suspension but that the RMV later imposed a separate lifetime administrative suspension under a different Chapter 90 provision. Opperman argued the RMV action was not one of the enumerated predicate suspensions listed in the third paragraph of Chapter 90, Section 23 and therefore the enhanced penalty provision should not apply to Foley. "The third paragraph is reserved explicitly for the enumerated offences," Opperman said. She relied on statutory construction principles and the rule of lenity, and cited the court's Nascimento decision in support of a narrower reading.

The prosecutor, Michael Magee of the Norfolk District Attorney's Office, told the court he reads the statute more broadly. Magee said Foley had not restored any right to operate after the court-ordered suspension and that the statutory language — which conditions the enhanced penalty on driving "prior to the restoration of such license or right to drive, or the issuance to him of a new license to operate" — is plain. "Mr. Foley had his license suspended under 24 G.S. [sic]. He did not restore his license. He is subject to that," Magee said, arguing the enhanced penalty remains in force until an individual obtains reinstatement or a lawful right to operate.

A central factual and legal issue pressed at argument was whether there are two parallel suspensions in Foley’s case: (1) a time-limited, court-ordered suspension tied to the conviction that expired after a fixed period (described in argument as 10 years), and (2) an independent RMV administrative suspension (described in argument as a lifetime suspension) that arose from a combination of convictions on Foley’s record, including a motor vehicle homicide. Opperman told the court that the RMV suspension was imposed administratively, not by a judge, and that administrative proceedings do not provide the same due-process protections as a criminal proceeding.

Counsel also debated what the statute means by the phrase "restoration of such license or right to drive." Opperman argued that expiration of the court-ordered suspension is one of the statutory alternatives that extinguishes the application of the enhanced penalty; Magee countered that the language plainly requires the license or right to be restored (or a new license issued) before the enhanced penalty is removed. Opperman warned that accepting the Commonwealth’s reading would subject people who never took affirmative steps to obtain a new license after a court suspension to an enhanced mandatory minimum penalty the legislature did not intend for non-enumerated suspensions.

The justices questioned both sides with hypotheticals—asking, for example, what would happen if a court suspension expired and the person simply drove without ever seeking reinstatement, and whether the statute’s phrasing "or the issuance to him of a new license to operate" undercuts Opperman’s interpretation. Opperman acknowledged some statutory awkwardness but repeated that the better reading, under rules of construction and the rule of lenity, is the narrower one that limits the enhanced penalty to suspensions expressly enumerated in the statute.

Attorneys for both sides also discussed related case law cited in briefs, including Nascimento and earlier decisions the parties described as analogous (Provost and Ray were referenced during argument). The prosecutor and defense counsel disagreed over the import of those precedents for the present statutory question.

The court also heard argument on a separate pretrial-motion issue referenced in the briefs (labeled in oral argument as a pretrial motion to dismiss under Chapter 90 provision cited by defense counsel), but the primary focus of the argument transcript supplied was the statutory interpretation problem about suspension sources and the scope of the third paragraph of Section 23.

No ruling was announced at the conclusion of argument in the transcript provided. The case will be the subject of a future written decision by the Supreme Judicial Court.