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Supreme Court hears dispute over whether Hobbs Act bars district courts from reassessing agency orders in private suits
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Summary
In McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates v. McKesson Corp., the justices debated whether the Hobbs Act’s channeling of review to the courts of appeals prevents district courts from evaluating the validity of agency orders — including FCC declaratory orders interpreting the TCPA — in private enforcement cases.
The Supreme Court heard oral argument Wednesday in McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates v. McKesson Corporation over whether the Hobbs Act prevents district courts from reviewing the validity of agency orders in private lawsuits. Counsel for the petitioner, Mister Wessler, urged the Court to allow district courts to evaluate agency interpretations in ordinary litigation, while counsel for respondents and the government argued the Hobbs Act channels exclusive review to the courts of appeals.
The question presented is whether the Hobbs Act’s grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the courts of appeals to “determine the validity of” covered agency actions requires wholesale channeling of all disputes about an agency’s statutory interpretation into the court of appeals — or whether there are meaningful offramps that allow district courts to decide issues that arise in garden‑variety civil litigation. The issue arose here from an FCC declaratory order (the “Amerifactors” order) interpreting a provision of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), which the parties dispute whether and how it binds later private suits.
If the Hobbs Act’s exclusivity is read to bar district‑court reconsideration whenever an agency has issued a covered order, parties could be required to seek preenforcement review in the courts of appeals within the Act’s 60‑day window or forgo an ability to contest the agency interpretation in later enforcement litigation. Mister Wessler argued that the text, context, structure and history of the Hobbs Act do not support such a sweeping rule and that the statute should not transform interpretive or nonbinding agency statements into permanently binding law for all later civil cases. “The Hobbs Act does not require district courts to treat agency orders that interpret federal statutes as binding precedent,” Wessler said in argument.
Respondent and government counsel pressed the opposite view. Mister Palmore told the Court the Hobbs Act’s language, settled predecessor precedent (including Yakus and Port of Boston/Transatlantic), and the statute’s purpose of uniformity and finality support exclusive review by the courts of appeals. “If Congress had wanted to limit this exclusivity to declaratory judgments, it would have done so,” Palmore said, arguing that the Act gives the courts of appeals authority not only over remedial relief but over the merits determination of an agency order’s validity.
Several justices pressed both sides on practical consequences and doctrinal lines. Justice Kagan and Justice Kavanaugh questioned whether the statute’s language contemplates an adequacy safety valve for parties who lacked a realistic opportunity to obtain Hobbs Act review; counsel acknowledged that the adequacy issue is a significant concern but noted that adequacy was conceded for purposes of this case. Justice Thomas asked about Port of Boston and other precedents; Mister Wessler drew distinctions based on whether a private party had been a participant in the underlying administrative proceeding. Mister Garnieri (arguing for another respondent) emphasized that the Hobbs Act historically has been read to bar collateral reassessment of agency rulings in private suits and stressed that agency declaratory orders can have legal force and thus be reviewable exclusively under the Hobbs Act.
Counsel and some justices also debated whether the character of an agency action — interpretive rule, legislative rule, or adjudication/declaratory order — matters for Hobbs Act coverage. Mister Wessler argued that interpretive, nonbinding guidance should not automatically strip district judges of their authority to evaluate statutory meaning in cases that arise without prior agency participation. Government and respondent counsel countered that some orders, including FCC declaratory orders issued after adjudication and notice and comment, have legal consequences and have traditionally been reviewable through the Hobbs Act.
The arguments highlighted competing emphases: one side stressing protection of district‑court authority to resolve statute‑interpretation questions that arise “organically” in private litigation, the other stressing Congress’s objective of finality, predictability and channeling in administrative‑law review. Several justices raised practical hypotheticals about repeat players, reliance interests, treble‑damages exposure under the TCPA, and how an exclusivity rule would affect parties who did not or could not file timely petitions in the court of appeals.
The case was submitted at the end of argument. The Court did not announce a decision.