Committee reviews H.44 amendment to address refusal of evidentiary blood draws and creates impaired‑driving task force

The House Committee on Judiciary reviewed amendment draft 1.1 to H.44 on measures tied to impaired‑driving investigations, including a proposed criminal refusal provision for hindering or refusing an evidentiary blood draw pursuant to a search warrant and a provision directing juvenile adjudication records to the Department of Motor Vehicles.

The discussion matters because the changes would alter how prosecutors can charge people who decline a blood draw sought by warrant, clarify what juvenile court records must be forwarded to DMV, and establish a temporary task force to study ways to shorten the time suspects are held during impaired‑driving investigations.

Ben Novogrovsky, legislative council attorney, opened the committee’s review and described the document as a “strike‑all amendment,” saying, “this is what we would call a strike all amendment,” and walked members through the substituted text and cross‑references. Novogrovsky explained the new subsection added to 12 01 would read in part that “a person suspected of violating the section shall not hinder the collection of an evidentiary blood sample when a warrant for that person's blood is issued pursuant to subdivision 12 02 f 1 of this title,” and that the subsection “shall not be construed as impairing that person's right to challenge the validity of the search warrant in subsequent legal proceedings.”

Committee members and witnesses debated the key wording used to describe the prohibited conduct. Judge Tom Zona, chief superior judge, warned that the word “hinder” is defined in case law (citing State v. Stone and State v. Oren) and could raise questions, asking whether a simple verbal refusal — “no, I don't want you to draw the blood” — would qualify as hindering. Zona suggested the committee could instead use language such as “refuse to submit to collection of an evidentiary blood sample pursuant to a warrant” to reduce uncertainty.

Erica Hall of the Office of the Defender General told the committee her office is “broadly supportive of the changes” but recommended two technical adjustments around juvenile reporting language. Hall proposed replacing the phrase “order of delinquency or establishing youthful offender status” with “order of adjudication pursuant to section 52 29 of this title” (the transcript references 52 81 sub d and 52 29 in the discussion) so the statute would capture the adjudication event that should be reported to DMV rather than later disposition materials. Hall said a record of adjudication — not the full judicial disposition — is what DMV needs to act promptly on driving‑related adjudications.

Marshall (identified in testimony as a juvenile defender and participant in drafting juvenile practice materials) agreed with focusing on “adjudication” rather than disposition. He and other witnesses said inserting the Title 23 language that specifies which juvenile adjudications must be forwarded to DMV (the transcript references a provision in 23 17 o 9) would avoid practitioners having to look up cross‑references.

Several prosecution and law‑enforcement voices, including Dennis Wegmans of the Department of State's Attorneys and Sheriffs, said they preferred the traditional statutory term “refusal” because that language has existing case law and is “well understood” in the field. Wegmans and others noted the bill, as drafted, could create scenarios where a suspect faces multiple charges arising from the same incident; they recommended statutory language to prevent double convictions for the same transaction of facts or to otherwise clarify sentencing exposure.

On the question of whether the new provision would expand exposure for serious charges, participants noted that current law already permits enhanced charges in particular circumstances (for example, prior convictions or crashes resulting in serious bodily injury). Judge Zona and other witnesses pointed out that treating the conduct as a refusal tied to DUI statutes — rather than as an obstruction/impeding felony — would keep the charge in the DUI statutory framework rather than transferring it to broader obstruction case law.

The amendment also directs the establishment of an “Impaired Driving Processing Task Force” to study implied‑consent procedures, minimize how long suspected impaired drivers are held during investigations, and recommend statutory or procedural changes. Novogrovsky summarized the task force membership as the defender general or designee, the commissioner of public safety or designee, the commissioner of motor vehicles or designee, the executive director of the Department of State's Attorneys and Sheriffs or designee, and a representative from the prosecutors’ association, with support from the Department of Public Safety. The task force would submit a report in the form of proposed legislation to the House and Senate Judiciary committees by November 15, 2025, hold no more than six meetings, and cease to exist on February 1, 2026.

Committee members asked staff to refine language to avoid unintended consequences (for example, whether someone could be charged under both a DUI count and a criminal refusal for the same conduct). Novogrovsky and witnesses said they would draft clarified language — suggested edits included changing “hinder” to “refuse to submit to collection of an evidentiary blood sample pursuant to a warrant” and adding a statutory limit so a defendant could not be convicted of more than one offense for the same transaction — and return with revised text.

No formal vote on H.44 or the draft 1.1 amendment occurred during the session. Members scheduled further review and indicated they would return to the issue at a subsequent meeting to consider updated language.

The committee heard technical and policy input from multiple legal stakeholders: legislative council staff, the Office of the Defender General, juvenile defenders, the Department of State's Attorneys and Sheriffs, and the chief superior judge. Speakers repeatedly emphasized the interplay among constitutional search‑and‑seizure considerations (cited in testimony as Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution), practical hospital‑based procedures for blood draws, and the desire to avoid converting routine DUI cases into more serious obstruction prosecutions unless the legislature intends that result.

Looking ahead, the committee directed staff to prepare amended language that clarifies the prohibited conduct, aligns juvenile‑record reporting language with the adjudication standard, and addresses whether statutes should prevent multiple convictions for the same incident. The legislation’s task force portion remains in draft form and would require subsequent committee scrutiny when its membership and charge are reflected in final text.