Appeals court hears challenge to termination of parental rights over ADA and reasonable-efforts claims

The Massachusetts Appeals Court heard oral argument Feb. 3 in Department of Children and Families v. Mother, an appeal of a juvenile court order terminating a mother—s parental rights to her two young children.

Attorney Amy Perry Mercier, arguing for the mother, told the panel the Department of Children and Families (DCF) assumed the mother could not parent because of her mental-health diagnoses and failed to provide required assessments, accommodations or reasonable efforts under federal disability law and DCF policy. "This case is about a mother with mental health challenges who was never given the opportunity to parent," Mercier said. "They failed to follow both the federal disability law and their own regulations and policies, and they failed to provide mother reasonable efforts and accommodations."

Mercier said an initial ADA meeting and a brief neuropsychological evaluation occurred but that DCF never completed an individualized assessment or followed through on recommended evaluations. She noted a parenting partner assigned to the mother lasted eight sessions and said the mother filed a neuropsychological assessment shortly before trial that recommended further testing that was not pursued. Mercier argued those gaps meant neither the mother nor the record ever had an adequate opportunity to show whether appropriate accommodations or services might have enabled reunification.

Kolkie, counsel for DCF, told the panel the mother did not meaningfully contest the juvenile court—s unfitness finding and that binding Supreme Judicial Court precedent (cases cited in the record as Gregory and Ilona) forecloses raising reasonable-efforts or ADA compliance as a defense to termination in this posture. "The juvenile court judge is required to consider the best interest of the child as paramount," Kolkie said, and the juvenile court—s findings showed DCF provided referrals to therapy and psychiatry and otherwise made reasonable efforts that ultimately did not produce the level of parental fitness required for reunification.

Kolkie and DCF pointed to evidence in the trial record that the mother sometimes refused to provide releases or limited them in ways that prevented DCF from obtaining treatment records. Kolkie said a treating therapist was reluctant to provide detailed information to DCF because of concerns about the legal status of releases, and that the mother—s own expert and testimony reflected distrust of services arranged by the department.

Jerobo Wilson, counsel for the two children, urged affirmance. He told the court the twins, then about 4 years old, have "heightened medical and developmental needs" and have lived in their kinship preadoptive home since infancy, where their needs are being met. "The record is clear that all their needs are being met in their preadoptive home," Wilson said, and he argued the juvenile court appropriately prioritized the children—s best interest in ordering termination and post-termination visitation.

Throughout argument the panel asked clarifying questions about the case record: which evaluations were in action plans; whether a neuropsychological or medical evaluation was performed and provided to DCF; the scope and results of the ADA meeting(s); and whether the mother—s prior criminal history and hospitalizations affected availability for care. Counsel agreed that earlier action plans included requests for a neuropsychological and medical evaluation and that later action plans emphasized therapy and psychiatric care but did not list those evaluations. The parties told the court the record does not explain why the evaluation items dropped from later action plans; the mother testified she underwent at least one evaluation but did not provide it to DCF, according to the record.

Neither counsel sought an immediate ruling from the panel at the end of argument. The oral argument concluded with the court noting logistical Zoom issues and adjourning the session.

Why this matters: The appeal raises two connected issues on which the panel—s decision could affect juvenile-court practice in Massachusetts: (1) whether and when alleged ADA failures and the adequacy of reasonable efforts can be raised on appeal from a termination order, given existing SJC precedent; and (2) how juvenile courts and DCF document and follow through on individualized assessments and accommodations for parents with significant mental-health needs.

Votes at a glance: Not applicable