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Appeals panel hears challenge to denial of judicial diversion for Justin Keith Willoughby
Summary
Appellate attorneys argued whether the trial court erred in denying judicial diversion to Justin Keith Willoughby while imposing probation. Appellant counsel said the court failed to articulate why probation, but not diversion, was appropriate; the state said the court reasonably relied on the offense circumstances and victim harm.
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An appellate panel in Tennessee heard arguments on whether the trial court improperly denied judicial diversion to Justin Keith Willoughby while imposing probation.
Appellant attorney Catalina Goodwin told the court that the trial court “abused its discretion by denying judicial diversion to Justin Keith Willoughby, a young, first time offender” and that the court failed to explain why probation was appropriate but diversion was not. Goodwin urged the panel to review the denial de novo because, she said, the trial court applied incorrect legal standards and gave undue weight to certain factors.
Why it matters: Judicial diversion, when available, can allow eligible defendants to avoid a permanent criminal conviction if they meet program terms. Whether a court must separately articulate why it denies diversion but grants probation affects appellate review standards and the availability of diversion for other defendants.
During argument, Goodwin contended the trial court erred in how it weighed several Rogers/Parker/Trent sentencing factors, including amendability to correction, deterrence and the circumstances of the offense. She said the record showed Willoughby accepted responsibility, pointed to a letter he submitted to the court and to his allocution, and noted treatment steps he took while the case was pending.
Willoughby’s written statement to the trial court was quoted by counsel: “I accept full responsibility for my conduct, and the harm and potential harm that my actions have caused. I fully and honestly regret every aspect of the situation.” Goodwin also told the panel that Willoughby completed three months of inpatient treatment in Pikeville and had documented remorse in the court record.
Catherine Redding, arguing for the State, said the trial court identified and weighed the relevant factors and that its denial of diversion is entitled to review for abuse of discretion. Redding emphasized the seriousness of the circumstances the court relied on: “The defendant was a security officer at her school,” she said, and told the panel the victim “had just turned 16,” that the incident occurred in the defendant’s office while he was in uniform, and that the victim required extended psychiatric hospitalization. The state argued those circumstances, together with concerns about general deterrence and public trust, supported the court’s decision.
Counsel for both sides debated whether the same common-law sentencing factors that inform probation decisions require an additional on-the-record explanation when a court grants probation but denies diversion. Goodwin argued the trial court needed to articulate the distinct policy purposes of judicial diversion and explain why probation was appropriate while diversion was not; the State urged that the court had adequately set out its reasoning and that denial of diversion may be upheld so long as there is substantial evidence supporting the decision.
The panel questioned counsel closely about whether the trial court relied on facts beyond the stipulated record, whether Willoughby had actually admitted the facts alleged by the State, and whether the court placed improper emphasis on the absence or degree of an apology to the victim. Counsel differed about whether the plea in the underlying case constituted a no-contest stipulation to the facts or a “best interest” plea that did not admit legal guilt; that distinction was raised by the panel as relevant to what facts the trial court could properly consider.
The attorneys also debated whether the court improperly invoked a broad deterrence interest in the law enforcement community given Willoughby’s prior certification and employment as a campus security officer. Goodwin maintained the trial court’s remarks about sending a message to law enforcement were speculative and unsupported by the record; the State said deterrence and public-interest concerns tied to a position of trust were legitimate considerations.
No ruling was issued during argument. The panel heard both sides and posed several questions about the record and applicable law; a decision resolving whether the trial court’s denial of judicial diversion must be reviewed de novo or for abuse of discretion will follow in the court’s opinion.
Ending: The case argued was State of Tennessee v. Justin Keith Willoughby; the panel took the case under advisement at the close of oral argument.

