Court of Criminal Appeals hears challenge to post‑conviction denial over alleged ineffective trial counsel

At an oral argument before the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals, Eastern Section, appellate counsel Chelsea Moore asked the court to reverse the trial court's denial of post‑conviction relief for appellant Blair Brown Jr., arguing trial counsel provided ineffective assistance and deprived Brown of his right to testify.

Moore told the three‑judge panel that Brown was arrested March 28, 2016, after picking up a friend who, unbeknownst to Brown, had a gun and drugs in the vehicle. Moore told the court the body‑worn camera shows Brown telling officers, "the gun is not mine," and that Brown "was unaware of" the drugs because they were hidden under the passenger seat. Moore argued trial counsel repeatedly contradicted the record, failed to pursue motions timely, went on vacation instead of securing hearings, misstated facts to the jury in opening and closing statements, and ultimately did not call Brown despite earlier indicating she would.

"He was unaware of them," Moore said of the drugs during argument, pointing the court to Brown's post‑conviction testimony and to a letter Brown wrote to the assistant district attorney. Moore said the trial lawyer's inconsistent testimony at the post‑conviction hearing and her actions at trial prejudiced Brown and left him unable to present his defense, including his desired testimony.

The state, represented by Ben Ball, urged deference to the post‑conviction court's credibility determinations. "It's the post conviction court's job to judge the credibility of witnesses," Ball said, arguing the trial court credited trial counsel over Brown and that the appellate court should not reweigh those findings. Ball also cited appellate precedent and the post‑conviction statute's waiver principles, saying a standalone claim that the trial court itself deprived Brown of the right to testify likely would have been waived under prior cases such as Thompson v. State (2018) unless raised earlier.

Judges pressed both sides on two central legal questions: whether Brown's claim that the trial court independently denied his right to testify is a freestanding constitutional claim that survives waiver rules, and whether the cumulative record of counsel's conduct amounts to constitutionally deficient performance under Strickland standards applied in the state's post‑conviction framework. One judge noted the court's prior decision in Thompson v. State and asked counsel to explain why that line of cases should not control the waiver question.

Moore acknowledged the overlap between the ineffective‑assistance claim and the separate claim that the trial court denied Brown the right to testify, arguing the latter "is a constitutional error" that may be raised in post‑conviction proceedings and that it would be unfair to hold Brown to raise a claim when trial counsel was the party at fault. Ball replied that the post‑conviction court treated the claim primarily as part of an ineffective‑assistance claim and that, had the standalone issue been litigated, the post‑conviction court likely would have found it waived.

Counsel and the panel discussed specific trial events Moore described: motions to suppress and for a speedy trial filed roughly a week before the originally scheduled trial date (June 19), counsel's testimony at the post‑conviction hearing that she did not intend to try the case on that date, and an opening statement in which Moore said trial counsel told the jury Brown was guilty while promising to explain why. Ball conceded counsel misstated facts in opening but argued that not every unfulfilled opening statement promise is reversible and emphasized that the post‑conviction court credited counsel's overall testimony.

The court heard argument but did not issue a decision. The panel recessed after oral argument; no opinion was announced at the hearing.

Appeals in post‑conviction proceedings hinge heavily on the trial court's credibility findings and on statutory waiver principles. The court's handling of the waiver question and any determination whether counsel's performance was deficient and prejudicial will determine whether Brown obtains a new trial or other relief.