Presenter tells joint education committees Brigham (1997) remains the foundation of Vermont school‑funding law

MONTPELIER — At a joint meeting of the Vermont Senate Education Committee and House Education Committee, presenter John Grey reviewed the Vermont Supreme Court’s 1997 Brigham decision and told lawmakers the ruling continues to shape the state’s education‑funding obligations.

"I'm gonna be talking about what the court says rather than what a hypothetical court might mean," John Grey, a staff member who presented to the committees, said as he opened his briefing. Grey outlined the legal findings and practical implications of Brigham for lawmakers weighing changes to the state’s school‑funding system.

Brigham grew from challenges to an earlier system (Act 84) that relied heavily on local property taxes and a state foundation tax rate. Grey walked committee members through a hypothetical example the court used: at a 1% foundation tax rate with a $5,000 foundation cost, a property‑poor district with a $400,000 grand list per pupil would raise $4,000 and require $1,000 in state aid to reach the foundation cost, while a property‑rich district could raise far more at the same rate. The result, Grey said, was wide disparities in revenues among districts and in their capacity to provide educational services.

Grey summarized Brigham’s key holdings: the Vermont Constitution recognizes a fundamental right to education; the state cannot abdicate its basic responsibility for public education by delegating it entirely to towns; and funding schemes that make educational opportunity "a function of district wealth" are constitutionally deficient. "Vermont students are constitutionally entitled to equal educational opportunities," Grey told the committees.

The presenter noted how the court drew a distinction between minimal adequacy and substantially equal opportunity. Brigham rejected the argument that providing only a minimal level of education to every district satisfied the Constitution, but it also did not require precise dollar‑for‑dollar equality of expenditures. The court left open how the state must implement remedies and did not prescribe a single funding mechanism, Grey said: "No particular system [of education funding] is mandated. You don't have to have property taxes. You don't have to have income taxes. The constitution does not speak to this."

Grey told members that subsequent litigation has provided some guidance but not a comprehensive update to Brigham. He cited a more recent case (referred to in the briefing as Vitali) in which the court treated tuitioning as a means of achieving educational opportunity rather than the opportunity itself. Grey cautioned that changes in factual conditions or court composition could affect how Brigham would be interpreted in future disputes.

Committee chair Peter Conlon, identified in the meeting as chair of the House Education Committee, and other members asked questions about Act 60 (the post‑Brigham system), Act 68, Act 127 and the historical adjustments that have been made to address equity concerns. Grey said those statutes and subsequent tweaks reflect ongoing efforts to equalize capacity, while acknowledging the political sensitivity of changes that affect property tax bills.

The presenter emphasized the practical policy tradeoffs: the court recognized money as only one variable affecting opportunity but also concluded it is "one that government can effectively equalize." Grey urged lawmakers to keep equity central in policy design while noting that the Supreme Court has not spelled out a single remedy or formula. He also said that revisiting Brigham in any definitive way would require new litigation reaching the Vermont Supreme Court.

The meeting did not include any formal votes or motions related to changes in law; the session was a briefing and discussion of legal principles and policy implications. Lawmakers signaled interest in reviewing historical choices and actuarial/empirical studies as they consider proposals this legislative session.