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Witnesses urge clearer deterrence, more offensive operations and expanded guard cyber units; AI seen as force multiplier
Summary
Panelists said deterrence requires operations that impose costs on adversaries, recommended publicly attributed operations to remove Chinese footholds, and supported adding National Guard cyber units and investing in AI to scale defense — while warning of attendant risks.
Committee members and witnesses debated the role of offensive cyber operations, the National Guard’s role in domestic cyber defense, and the promise and risks of artificial intelligence in cybersecurity.
Several witnesses and members urged a more aggressive posture to impose costs on adversaries. Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery said the United States should “publicly execute operations against Chinese cyber infrastructure to say, we know you did this,” arguing that public attribution and removal of adversary infrastructure would deter further behavior even if it sacrifices an intelligence access.
Witnesses described two complementary deterrence approaches: “deterrence by denial,” meaning stronger defenses and resilience, and “deterrence by punishment,” meaning the ability to impose costs on adversaries through offensive operations. Adam Myers recommended increasing the tempo of coordinated operations that have previously degraded threat‑actor capabilities and said Congress should perform oversight to ensure agencies pursue such operations and that resources are aligned.
Congressional members pressed the panel on the National Guard and other state assets. Chairman Green said he plans to sponsor an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act to create a National Guard cyber defense unit in every state; Montgomery supported the idea, saying governors have specific authorities and local relationships that make Guard units useful for domestic response and resilience.
On artificial intelligence, witnesses said AI and machine learning are already integrated into defensive tools and can rapidly improve detection and response. “We’ve been using machine learning and artificial intelligence for the last 14 years at CrowdStrike,” Myers said, and panelists argued that AI can make junior analysts more effective. Several witnesses also warned that adversaries will seek to weaponize AI and that protecting AI model assets will be a national‑security priority.
Members also raised concerns about legal authorities to “hack back.” Witnesses and members were divided on privately authorized offensive action. Montgomery recommended building a dedicated cyber force (analogous to a military service) to conduct offensive operations in the long term; he preferred government‑led capabilities or tightly controlled contractor engagements rather than broadly authorizing private companies to strike back under a letters‑of‑marque model.
Why this matters: Witnesses said a balanced approach — stronger defenses, clearer authority for coordinated offensive operations, expanded state and Guard cyber capabilities, and investment in AI — is necessary to raise the cost to adversaries and protect critical services.
