Transportation committee holds informational briefing on mobile driver’s licenses, digital ID

The Committee on Transportation convened an informational hearing on mobile driver’s licenses and digital identification featuring Kansas Department of Revenue staff and a national motor-vehicle administrators’ representative.

The briefing, presented by Zach Denny of the Kansas Department of Revenue and Michael McCaskill of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA), explained that a mobile driver’s license (MDL) is an optional, cryptographically signed digital credential issued by the state that is intended to supplement — not replace — a physical driver’s license.

The MDL, McCaskill said, is not a simple photograph or PDF of a card but a digitally authenticated credential provisioned to a device and verifiable by an electronic reader. “If you do that and you put a picture of that driver license or a PDF of that driver license on your phone as a picture, none of the security features are in play,” McCaskill said. He added that MDLs rely on public/private key cryptography and a system of public certificates so relying parties can verify a credential “was issued by the state of Kansas.”

Why it matters: committee members pressed on where MDLs could be used (TSA, age checks, point-of-sale, online authentication), who controls which data are released, how stored data are protected, implementation costs and which entities would bear them. Several members raised privacy, fraud and market-concentration concerns and asked whether MDLs could be effectively made de facto mandatory by private businesses.

Key presentation points - Optionality and baseline credential: Zach Denny said the Department has “no intent to replace a physical credential or make a mobile driver's license or digital identification mandatory.” He reiterated that the hard-copy license would remain the state’s base credential. - Issuance and technical standard: McCaskill described ISO 18013-5 (the MDL standard) and said MDLs carry the same data as a physical card but are encrypted, signed by the issuing authority and must be read by an electronic reader. He said AAMVA operates a Digital Trust Service (DTS) that distributes states’ public keys to verifiers. - Use cases: TSA boarding was identified as the largest current use; other uses include age verification at retail, hotel check-in, point-of-sale, car rental and online authentication for state portals (a newer “Part 7” internet protocol was cited). McCaskill: “TSA is by far the biggest use case at the moment.” - Privacy controls: McCaskill and Kent Soh of the Division of Vehicles emphasized that the credential holder chooses which data elements to share. “The customer is never not in control of what data is shared with any relying party at any time,” McCaskill said. - Storage, breaches and liability: McCaskill said data sent to relying parties may be stored per state or industry rules (commonly 30–60 days for audit purposes) and that AMVA and the issuing state are not a party to the in-person transaction between holder and relying party. When asked about breaches, he said, “No, sir. Not if you're talking specifically about the MDL Cybersecurity.” He added that the transmission uses encrypted Bluetooth Low Energy in close proximity.

Questions from committee members and staff - Voting and law enforcement: Representative Proctor asked whether MDLs could be used for voter ID or law-enforcement stops. Presenters said current practice would continue to use the physical license for voting and law-enforcement stops; using MDLs for those purposes would require statutory changes and operational changes at polling places and for police. - Cost and governance: Representative Helgerson asked how much Kansas would pay and whether the effort is a private venture. Kent Soh and Denny said the committee is in information-gathering and that implementation costs and state contributions have not been finalized. McCaskill said AAMVA is a nonprofit funded by member jurisdictions; he said the AAMVA Digital Trust Service does not charge the state for listing public keys. - Reliance and market effects: Representatives expressed concern that widespread acceptance by large retailers could make MDLs functionally necessary even if optional in law. Presenters noted similar dynamics occurred with digital payments but stressed that both digital and physical options have continued to coexist.

Outstanding policy points noted for follow-up included: fiscal impacts and fiscal notes for any enabling legislation; statutory limits on uses (for example, explicit prohibitions for voting or law enforcement if desired); vendor agreements and key-management procedures; and consumer protections for stored data held by relying parties.

The committee did not take formal action on MDL policy at this hearing; the session was described repeatedly as informational. The presenters provided contact information and materials for committee members to review after the hearing.

The committee chair closed the hearing after questions from multiple members and scheduled follow-up committee briefings for the coming week.