Multiple witnesses told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that fundamental and unclassified research at U.S. universities and national laboratories is at risk from PRC exploitation, particularly in fields such as artificial intelligence, quantum research, chemical engineering and brain science.

Dr. Glenn Tiffert said long‑standing categories like “dual use” or “small yards, high fences” no longer capture the risk that fundamental, openly published research can be harvested and applied for military or otherwise sensitive ends. He said: “There is real risk…because no one was doing the basic due diligence to understand who they were partnering with,” and urged better data collection on where sensitive research collaborations occur.

Witnesses noted pressure points that have widened vulnerability: U.S. universities’ dependence on international tuition after the 2008 financial crisis; direct grants, joint appointments and research partnerships with Chinese entities; and the presence of large numbers of visiting scholars and short‑term delegations at national laboratories. Senator Jim Risch and others cited the Idaho National Laboratory as an example of a site with numerous international visitors and noted coordination between DOE counterintelligence and FBI personnel to protect sensitive facilities.

Panelists pointed to recent legislation and policies—such as provisions in the CHIPS and Science Act, NSPM‑33 and National Defense Authorization Act measures—that begin to require universities and funders to better protect critical research, but they said more is needed. Recommendations included: stronger screening of foreign research partners, clearer reporting and auditing of foreign funding and contracts, federal support to help universities build robust research‑security offices, and a stepped‑up role for agencies to coordinate protective measures for unclassified but sensitive projects.

Witnesses also warned that adversaries could repurpose commercially useful advances—such as drone control, AI models and brain‑computer interfaces—into military capabilities, arguing that protecting innovation requires new policy categories and closer federal‑university engagement without shutting off legitimate scholarly exchange.