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Pro se appellant challenges denial of attorney-fees award tied to separation agreement; appeals court hears arguments
Summary
Eileen Hoffner, appearing pro se, urged the Appeals Court to reverse a lower court decision denying fees and expenses she sought under separation-agreement provisions and G.L. c. 231 § 6F. The appellee disputed facts about offers and notice; the panel took the case under advisement.
The panel heard oral argument Jan. 15 in Docket No. 231245, Hoffner v. Siegel, where pro se appellant Eileen Hoffner sought recovery of attorney fees and costs through contractual and equitable remedies connected to a prior separation agreement.
Hoffner argued that paragraph 18.1 of the parties’ separation agreement authorized her to seek counsel fees and that paragraph 18.2 — which supplies a fee-shifting remedy where a party defaults — applies because the appellee defaulted in performance. Hoffner told the court she received a personal service of process and later enforced judgments by selling property to satisfy the award; she said any procedural objections were not timely raised below and thus should be deemed waived.
Steven Siegel, the appellee, responded that he never agreed to a contractual commitment to pay a specific sum in legal fees, that his financial circumstances limited any settlement offers, and that the contested fee requests were excessive. Siegel also disputed Hoffner’s characterization of settlement offers and payments; he said he did not have the sums Hoffner described and that the parties had negotiated amounts short of the judgment.
The panel questioned counsel and the pro se appellant about whether paragraph 18.1 is a standalone authorization for fee applications or whether 18.2’s notice and remedy provisions must be triggered before contractual fee recovery. Justices also asked about the completeness of the contract on the record and whether statutory authority (cited in the parties’ filings as G.L. c. 231 § 6F and related Superior Court rules) supports the requested relief.
Following argument, the court took the matter under advisement.
