Texas justices wrestle with whether doctor's letter about a service dog triggers health-care liability rules

Summary

At oral argument before the Supreme Court of Texas, lawyers disputed whether a physician's statements that a patient's dog was a 'service animal' fall within the state's health-care-liability statute (Chapter 74), touching on issues of scope of practice, causation/standing and what type of expert is required.

At oral arguments before the Supreme Court of Texas, lawyers for the parties in Biedman v. Waldroup debated whether letters from a physician certifying that a patient's dog performed tasks to treat her generalized anxiety disorder are "health care liability" claims under Texas law and therefore subject to Chapter 74 procedures.

The question matters because if the court treats the statements as health-care-liability claims, the physician-defendant would be entitled to pre-suit procedural protections in Chapter 74, including the requirement for an expert report and potential abatement of proceedings. Petitioner counsel, Miss Chang, told the court the issue was "whether the Waldrops' claims ... are health care liability claims arising from the patient-physician relationship," arguing that the letter and the physician's representations about the dog are connected to medical care and therefore require medical-expert proof.

In response, respondent counsel, Miss Farrell, said the core of the plaintiffs' complaint is "the statement that doctor Liebman made about that dog, about Kingston.…

Texas justices wrestle with whether doctor's letter about a service dog triggers health-care liability rules

Summary

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