High court probes whether statute bars courts from overruling voluntary paternity acknowledgments

The Supreme Judicial Court heard oral argument in SJC-13665 over whether Massachusetts law prevents a probate judge from setting aside a voluntary acknowledgment of parentage (VAP) more than a year after it is signed, counsel for the appellant said during argument.

The issue arose after a mother filed a complaint to establish paternity more than five years after her child's birth. David Cherny, attorney for the appellant, told the court that another man had signed a VAP under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 209C §11 and that the statute makes such acknowledgments "nonchallengeable" after the statutory time periods have expired. "This is a case that presents to the court what I see as the lower court's clear error in applying the law as it's written," Cherny said.

Why it matters: The question touches on competing policies—finality of paternity adjudications and the statutory safety valves that allow rescission within limited windows versus the biological father's interest and the child's potential interest in genetic relationship and retroactive support. Cherny told the justices the VAP could have been revoked within 60 days or challenged within a year for fraud, duress, or mutual mistake, but the mother's complaint arrived more than five years after the birth.

Argument and statutory text: Cherny argued the probate judge lacked equitable authority to override the deadlines set in §11. A justice pressed him on standing and on whether his client sought to challenge the original execution of the VAP or the later rescission; Cherny said his client was not attacking the execution but rather the attempt to rescind the VAP after the statutory windows had passed. He repeatedly returned to the text of section 11, saying the statute makes the acknowledgment final after the set periods and that equity cannot be used "to circumvent a statutory requirement." He cited prior Massachusetts decisions addressing similar issues.

Appellee's position: Pamela Shaffer, counsel for the appellee, acknowledged the legislature adopted time limits to provide certainty but argued the factual record in this case differs from many precedents because neither the signatory nor the biological father had a substantial, ongoing relationship with the child. "The legislative purpose was really to protect children and to look to making sure that people don't take these things lightly," Shaffer told the court, adding that early conduct by the mother and the signatory indicated both parties believed he was the child's father.

New statutory provisions and retroactivity: Justices and counsel discussed recently enacted provisions referenced during argument (counsel identified a new section 26 and section 25I of chapter 209C). Cherny questioned whether those provisions apply retroactively to a case already on appeal and suggested the new statutory framework (which, counsel said, includes multi-factor standards for recognizing more than one father) likely is not retroactive. Shaffer pointed to statutory subsections she said permit a court to adjudicate a plaintiff with standing under specified standards.

Equity and precedent: The justices repeatedly probed whether the probate court's equitable jurisdiction survives the statute of repose in §11. Counsel referenced state and out-of-state decisions by name during argument; Shaffer cited CC v. AB and Godin v. Godin in support of a continuing equity jurisdiction in some circumstances, while Cherny emphasized the statute's plain language and prior decisions treating the time limits as binding.

Record facts noted at argument: Counsel said the complaint to establish paternity was filed roughly five years and two days after the child's birth; the transcript records a January 2023 hearing before Judge Barber in which the signatory and the mother answered questions on the record (counsel described those responses as evidence considered by the probate judge). Counsel also discussed that the signatory provided emotional and financial support for some months around the birth but later ceased contact.

Outcome at argument: The justices questioned both sides but did not announce a decision at argument. The record reflects disagreement about (1) whether equity can override the statutory time limits in §11, (2) whether the newer statutory provisions cited by counsel apply while the appeal is pending, and (3) the proper weight of the factual record about relationships and support.

The court took the matter under advisement; no ruling was made from the bench during the argument session recorded in the transcript.