High court hears dispute over post-judgment interest after $20 million payment in Majestic Honda case

At oral argument in SJC-13651, counsel debated whether a post-judgment payment of roughly $20,000,000 satisfied the judgment and halted statutory post-judgment interest or whether the payment remained conditional because of released attachments and a remaining $3,000,000 the appellants said was still in dispute.

Richard Brianski, attorney for the appellant 849 South Washington Street LLC, told the court that the $20,000,000 wired directly to Majestic was “immediately available for their use” and carried no independent restriction or encumbrance at the time of payment. “As soon as that debt is paid ... the real estate attachment as a matter of law is gone,” Brianski said, arguing that the payment was unconditional and that the appellant had preserved its right to appeal.

Michael McDonough, counsel for the appellee H1 Lincoln d/b/a Majestic Honda, countered that the trial court properly fashioned a “balanced approach” by treating much of the payment as unrestricted while leaving about $3,000,000 tied to the aspects of the judgment still contested on appeal. McDonough told the court that the appellants “told the judge” they would pay the undisputed portion and secure any remaining exposure by bond or other means, and he argued the record showed continuing liabilities — including an unpaid fee-and-cost award of roughly $92,000 — that justified retaining some post-judgment protections.

Central legal points at issue included the effect of a judgment debtor’s voluntary payment on the accrual of statutory post-judgment interest; the distinction between an outright payment and a Rule 67 deposit; and whether removing a lis pendens and real-estate attachment as part of the payment sequence meant the creditor had full, unfettered use of the funds. Brianski emphasized the practical risk the appellant assumed by paying rather than posting a bond, noting it was different from the conditional-payment cases cited by the appellee. McDonough stressed precedent and policy, telling the justices that post-judgment interest serves to “compensate judgment creditors for the delay in the payment of the judgment and also to make them in the same position they would have enjoyed otherwise.”

Both sides referenced state appellate decisions the parties say are dispositive on the legal standard, and argued whether the superior court’s approach should be reviewed de novo as an issue of law or under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Brianski urged the court to treat the issue as one of law tied to the post-judgment interest statute; McDonough defended the trial court’s discretionary, fact-specific balancing.

Counsel also discussed alternatives the appellant could have used to protect the appellee while preserving an appeal — chiefly obtaining an appellate bond — and the practical reasons the appellant chose to wire funds instead. McDonough warned of a policy consequence if paying a judgment while appealing were treated as sufficient to stop all post-judgment interest: parties could secure an interest-free, “free” appeal simply by paying the judgment and pursuing a long-shot appeal, he said.

The argument further explored whether the existence of a remaining, quantified disputed amount ($3,000,000, as characterized by the parties) and later awards entered after the initial payment meant the payment should be treated as conditional for the disputed portion. Counsel also debated whether certain materials — an email identifying the disputed amount — properly belonged in the appellate record.

The court heard both sides and asked clarifying questions about the practical and doctrinal consequences of treating the $20,000,000 transfer as either fully satisfying the judgment or only partially satisfying it. No opinion was announced at the argument’s close.