NCSL adviser urges holistic election security: cyber navigators, audits and local capacity

Luke Belant, project manager for elections and redistricting at the National Conference of State Legislatures, briefed the Joint Committee on Kansas Security on practices and trends in election security, with emphasis on cybersecurity, physical protections for election infrastructure and federal resource shifts.

Belant urged a holistic view of security, saying election offices should treat cyber and physical protections together and maintain frequent lines of communication with security practitioners and local law enforcement. He recommended procedures that states are increasingly adopting: pre‑election equipment testing (logic and accuracy tests), asset management and chain‑of‑custody practices (locks, serialized tamper‑evident seals and digital logs), surveillance camera deployment for ballot dropboxes and ballot processing areas, and post‑election audits.

Nut graf — why the briefing matters: Belant told the committee that these practices — tested equipment, auditable chain of custody, cameras and audits — are the practical steps local election offices can use to protect both election integrity and transparency.

Audits and transparency: Belant described two common audit types: tabulation audits (confirming ballot counts) and broader procedural audits (assessing process quality). He reviewed a national map of audit adoption and explained that risk‑limiting audits (RLAs), which use statistical formulas to determine sample size, are increasingly used in states that prioritize ballot‑level verification.

Cyber and physical measures: Belant cited growing interest in state‑level "cyber navigator" programs (state employees who provide cybersecurity expertise and rapid escalation support to local election offices) and in endpoint and network protections for election systems. He described varied approaches to physical safety — door access modernization, bullet‑resistant barriers for election offices, panic buttons, and formal local‑law‑enforcement coordination — and noted that volunteer and observer programs require credentialing and background checks.

Federal resources in 2025: Belant warned of reduced federal manpower and grant uncertainty. He said many CISA staff positions that provided hands‑on election support were eliminated in 2025; he also noted a proposed fiscal‑year 2026 budget that would provide no EAC (Election Assistance Commission) grant funding, creating uncertainty and pushing states toward state and multistate collaboration and nonprofit membership models (for example, the Center for Internet Security's membership model for the Election Infrastructure ISAC).

Ending: Belant recommended that Kansas consider options such as cyber navigators, improved chain‑of‑custody tools and strengthened state‑to‑local coordination to offset federal resource reductions.