House Homeland Security Subcommittee Warns of Growing Agroterrorism Risks, Calls for More Funding and Diagnostics

House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Emergency Management Technology members heard expert testimony Wednesday warning that U.S. food and agriculture face growing vulnerabilities to deliberate biological and cyber attacks, and that gaps in funding, diagnostics and coordination leave the country more exposed.

The hearing opened with Subcommittee Chairman Strong saying the purpose was to "assess the threat of agroterrorism to the United States food and agriculture sector and examine how federal efforts to prevent, respond to, and recover from such attacks can be strengthened." Ranking Member Kennedy and several witnesses highlighted recent funding pauses and proposed federal cuts that they said could weaken surveillance and response capacity.

The hearing drew four witnesses with academic and biodefense expertise: Dr. Daniel K. Williams, president of Alabama A&M University; Dr. Christopher A. Young, professor of practice at Auburn University College of Veterinary Medicine; Dr. Marty Bernin, director of the National Agricultural Biosecurity Center at Kansas State University; and Dr. Asha George, executive director of the Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense.

"Farm security is national security," Dr. Williams said, summarizing the testimony of land-grant university officials who described research, extension and diagnostic roles in detecting and responding to threats. Williams cited Bureau of Economic Analysis figures that agriculture and related industries contributed roughly $1.5 trillion to U.S. gross domestic product and said the sector's scale makes it an attractive target for hostile actors.

Witnesses described multiple threat vectors: deliberate introduction of animal or plant pathogens, misuse of laboratory materials, cyberattacks on automated farm systems, and possible risks tied to foreign purchases of farmland. Dr. Young testified that "there is no single vetted source of information addressing the diversity and complexity of the threats to food, agriculture and water," and urged better coordination of surveillance data.

Several witnesses urged improvements in diagnostics and laboratory networks. Dr. Bernin said rapid, accurate diagnostics, plus planning and training for local responders, are "critical" to identifying, locating and controlling a high-consequence disease. Witnesses noted existing state and regional information-sharing mechanisms and said classified information sharing can play a role in early warning.

Witnesses and members raised concrete operational gaps. Ranking Member Kennedy told the panel that Cornell University's animal diagnostic lab — part of the USDA National Animal Health Laboratory Network — had two USDA funding agreements paused, and warned that pausing those agreements would "weaken the biosecurity surveillance system." Kennedy also cited FEMA counterterrorism funding cuts, saying FEMA announced $134,000,000 in cuts and that New York City faces a $64,000,000 reduction this year — funding that supports first responders involved in biodefense and agrosecurity.

Panelists recommended several steps Congress and federal agencies could take short of legislation being adopted at the hearing: expand and fund diagnostic capacity down to the local level; bring together whole-genome sequencing and laboratory data into accessible repositories to improve attribution and trend detection; increase the number and training of agricultural inspectors and local extension agents; and provide law-enforcement partners (FBI, CBP, ICE) with resources for investigation and interdiction.

One practicable change proposed by witnesses was increased testing of intercepted agricultural items. A witness said that when Customs and Border Protection intercepts seeds or animal products "those items are not tested. Those items are just destroyed," and recommended testing intercepted materials to improve understanding of actual risk and attribution.

Members pressed witnesses on specific vulnerabilities. Questions covered which ports of entry are most exposed; whether U.S. research institutions can continue international collaborations while protecting intellectual property; the role of foreign-owned farmland near military installations; and how reductions in FEMA capacity would affect distribution of medical countermeasures. Dr. George warned bluntly about funding: "If the funding disappears, I think we're at risk of being attacked. Period."

Throughout the hearing witnesses repeatedly stressed that natural outbreaks and accidental introductions can produce consequences indistinguishable from deliberate acts, and that preparedness for either requires the same surveillance, diagnostics, response planning and funding. Several witnesses said that plant and animal diagnostics, coupled with coordinated exercises that bring together public health, state emergency managers, agriculture agencies and local responders, are essential.

The subcommittee asked the witnesses to answer follow-up questions in writing and left the hearing record open for 10 days. No formal legislative actions or votes were taken at the hearing.

The hearing transcript and testimony identify a set of recurring needs: sustained federal funding for laboratory networks and preparedness grants, improved diagnostic tools and data-sharing, enhanced border inspection testing and sequencing, and more resources for law enforcement and local responders to detect and attribute biological threats affecting agriculture.