Court of Appeals hears Bell appeal over theft‑of‑rental‑vehicle statute, jury instructions and body‑cam evidence

The Utah Court of Appeals heard oral argument in State v. Bell, a criminal appeal raising three principal questions: whether a statutory provision tied to rental‑agreement language is an element (or necessary predicate) of the theft‑of‑rental‑vehicle offense; whether trial counsel’s choices regarding jury instructions and pretrial motions constituted ineffective assistance; and whether repeated comments by a police officer on body‑worn camera that the defendant was lying prejudiced the jury.

Wendy Brown, counsel for the appellant Randy Bell, argued that the prosecution never proved — and in fact could not have proved from the trial record — a required contractual notice in the rental agreement that the statute places on rental companies. Brown asked the panel to treat that requirement as an element or necessary predicate of the elevated theft offense. “If subsection 3 is not required to commit the offense, what is it?” Brown asked the panel in argument.

The state responded that the statutory text and structure do not support treating the rental‑company notice provision as an element, and that a separate subsection in the provision sets out obligations for rental companies rather than conditions that must be proved against a defendant.

Brown also argued the jury was given only a broad description of the crime (the instructions told jurors to find the defendant “knowingly failed without good cause to return the vehicle within 72 hours” and similar elements) but was not instructed about the elevated felony level in a way that would allow the jury to appreciate the difference between a civil/contract dispute and a criminal theft reaching second‑degree felony exposure. She said trial counsel was ineffective for not pressing for a directed verdict or for an instruction that would have clarified the statutory elements.

Finally, Brown told the panel the trial record included repeated body‑worn camera and testimony references in which a police officer said the defendant was lying. Brown said the officer used the phrase that the defendant “was a liar” or “she lied” at least 17 times in the trial record and in the recorded interaction, and that the court must treat repeated, inadmissible attacks on credibility — particularly by a police officer whose testimony carries weight with jurors — as prejudicial when defense counsel does not obtain a limiting or curative instruction.

The state argued the body‑cam segments and officer testimony were admissible either to show contemporaneous statements during the interaction or for impeachment, and that trial counsel reasonably elected to use the body‑worn footage as part of a defensive strategy rather than excluding it. The state also relied on statutory structure and precedent to oppose reading the rental‑company subsection as an element.

Why this matters: if the appeals court accepts the appellant’s reading, many convictions under the theft‑of‑rental‑vehicle provision could be affected where the record lacks the specific rental‑agreement language the statute references. The case also raises common trial‑level questions about how trial counsel should use or exclude body‑cam footage and how much a jury should be told about elevated felony classifications tied to statutory predicates.

On the record, the judges questioned whether the rental‑company language — placed in a separately numbered subsection — was meant as a predicate for the elevated offense or simply a separate, non‑element duty. The panel discussed the rule of lenity and whether any ambiguity in statutory text should be resolved in a defendant’s favor. Judges also pressed the state to explain how a defendant could fairly be put on notice of a second‑degree felony if the rental‑agency notice was not present.

The panel took argument and did not issue a ruling from the bench. The case was submitted for decision after rebuttal argument.