Appeals court hears dispute over parental termination vs. permanent guardianship and whether juvenile court misapplied "strictly necessary" test

A three-judge panel of the Utah Court of Appeals heard argument on an appeal challenging a juvenile court order that terminated a parent's rights and favored adoption over permanent guardianship, focusing on whether the trial court misapplied the statutory standard that termination be “strictly necessary to promote the best interest” of the child.

The panel, chaired by Judge Ryan Tenney and joined by Judges Michelle Christiansen Forrester and John Luthy, questioned counsel about whether the juvenile court had compartmentalized the “strictly necessary” inquiry instead of treating it together with the broader best‑interest analysis. Judge Tenney prefaced argument by reminding counsel of logistical rules: “We allot 15 minutes per side per argument. There's a clock at the podium.”

The attorney identified in the transcript as “Hitachi,” who stated he represented the minor child, told the court the juvenile judge had made detailed findings that “termination was in the best interest of the child” and that the problem on appeal was the juvenile court’s legal framing. “The court went through all of the statutory factors,” counsel said, but he argued the court erred by treating the strictly necessary inquiry in isolation rather than “strictly necessary to promote the best interest.”

Counsel for the mother, identified in the transcript as Sonia Tachek, answered that the record showed a viable relative placement and that a juvenile court would err in imposing an “unwanted legal structure” on a family where permanent custody and guardianship was suitable. She told the panel she expected a remand would lead to the same outcome: a guardianship, based on a present‑tense assessment at remand.

Why this matters: the appeal turns on how courts must weigh statutory factors when deciding whether to terminate parental rights rather than allow a permanent guardianship. If the appeals court finds the juvenile court applied the law incorrectly, the case could be remanded with instructions about how to incorporate the strictly‑necessary language into a holistic best‑interest determination — and the practical consequences for the child (termination plus adoption versus guardianship) could change who has legal control and how visitation or parental contact is handled.

During argument judges pressed both sides on predictable consequences of a remand. Judge Luthy asked whether a remand would require the juvenile court to re‑weigh facts as of the date of remand. Counsel for the mother said that, under controlling precedent, a remand would require a present‑tense analysis and the outcome could be the same; counsel for the minor argued the factual work of the trier of fact was complete and that the appeal concerns only application of law.

The court and counsel also discussed a point raised in briefs and raised by Judge Christiansen Forrester: the placement's household consists of a grandfather and another adult who are not married, and the record shows the grandmother provided most of the day‑to‑day care. Counsel and the court debated whether the juvenile order sufficiently accounted for the fact that, if parental rights were terminated, the person who actually provides the child's daily care might not be the person who could legally adopt without additional procedural steps. Counsel for the minor said the juvenile court received evidence on the household relationship; counsel for the mother said the point supported the argument for guardianship.

Jurisdiction and finality also featured in argument. Counsel for the minor argued that the termination order was a final adjudication on the separate petition to terminate parental rights and thus properly before the appeals court. Counsel for the mother argued that because the juvenile court retained ongoing jurisdiction to implement parenting time and visitation details under a guardianship, the order could be nonfinal and therefore subject to dismissal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

No decision was announced. After extended colloquy the panel heard rebuttal and submitted the case. Judge Tenney closed the argument by informing counsel the panel would remain for the next case and then recessed: “Thank you very much for your arguments today. This case will be submitted.”

Provenance: portions of this article summarize argument that began when counsel identified himself for the minor and made opening remarks (transcript excerpt: "May it please the court, Hitachi, on behalf of the minor child."), and concluded at submission (transcript excerpt: "Thank you very much for your arguments today. This case will be submitted.").