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Utah Court of Appeals hears dispute over whether 'strictly necessary' standard was misapplied in parental-termination order
Summary
A three-judge panel of the Utah Court of Appeals on Tuesday heard arguments in an appeal of a juvenile-court order that terminated a mother’s parental rights and favored adoption over a permanent custody-and-guardianship placement with relatives.
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A three-judge panel of the Utah Court of Appeals on Tuesday heard arguments in an appeal of a juvenile-court order that terminated a mother’s parental rights and favored adoption over a permanent custody-and-guardianship placement with relatives. Judge Ryan Tenney chaired the panel, which included Judges Michelle Christiansen Forrester and John Luthy.
The appeal centers on whether the juvenile court treated the statutory "strictly necessary" requirement in isolation instead of as part of the broader best-interest analysis required by the statute. Counsel for the mother, Sonia Turchic, argued the juvenile court had repeatedly found termination was in the child’s best interest but then erred in how it applied the strictly necessary language; counsel for the guardian and the Office of the Guardian ad Litem defended the court’s overall findings and urged that a remand would not change the outcome.
The issue at the heart of the argument is statutory interpretation. Counsel for the parent said the juvenile court compartmentalized its analysis — drawing a separate block labeled "strictly necessary" and concluding that, on that discrete point, the standard was not met — rather than viewing whether termination was ‘‘strictly necessary to promote the child’s best interest’’ as an integrated part of the statutory best-interest framework. The guardian’s counsel and the guardian ad litem argued the juvenile court made extensive fact findings on the child’s needs and the record supports the court’s conclusion that permanency through adoption, rather than guardianship, best served those needs.
Judges on the panel pressed both sides on two related procedural questions: (1) whether a remand would permit the juvenile court to conduct a present‑tense inquiry as of the time of remand, and (2) whether the order under review is final and therefore properly before the appellate court. Judge Tenney asked whether a permanent guardianship gives the same practical control over parental contact as an adoption and, if not, whether that difference is what drove the juvenile court’s conclusion favoring termination and adoption. Turchic acknowledged the juvenile court had made findings about stability and risk of relapse and quoted the juvenile-court findings that the court believed adoption “would put the grandfather . . . in firm control” and provide “the highest level of stability and legal protection for permanent placement.”
Counsel and the panel also discussed who would actually adopt if parental rights were terminated: the order described adoption as the preferred permanency outcome even though the record shows the grandparents are not married and evidence suggests the grandmother provided most caregiving. Counsel for the mother and the guardian both noted the juvenile court had received and referenced evidence about that household structure; the judges asked whether the juvenile court had adequately considered how a post-termination adoption might affect the day-to-day caregiver relationship described in the record.
On finality and jurisdiction, the mother’s counsel argued the order on appeal was not final because the juvenile court had not yet resolved residual issues such as parent time and visitation tied to a later parenting-plan proceeding. Counsel for the guardian countered that the termination petition itself was a separate cause of action that produced a final adjudication for purposes of appeal even though the court retained ongoing juvenile jurisdiction over other matters.
The panel discussed potential remedies if it finds an error of law. Judges asked whether the court should remand for reapplication of the correct statutory standard while limiting the juvenile court to the facts already found; counsel for the mother contended that treating "strictly necessary" in its proper statutory context could require remand and entry of a different disposition given the juvenile court’s fact findings favoring termination. Judges also asked whether a remand would require the juvenile court to evaluate current conditions on the ground; counsel for the guardian said it would and predicted the same ultimate outcome based on the existing record and subsequent filings.
Counsel for both sides agreed the appeal turns on statutory construction and how statewide precedent and case law require courts to treat "strictly necessary to promote the best interest" alongside traditional best-interest factors. The panel took the case under advisement after oral argument.
The case was submitted to the Court of Appeals for decision; the court said it would issue an opinion in due course.

