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DJI official defends data practices, warns U.S. supply gaps if imports are restricted
Summary
Adam Welsh, head of global policy for DJI, told a Michigan House oversight subcommittee that the company has multiple data-protection measures, urged continuing technical reviews rather than market bans, and said U.S. public-safety and commercial users face immediate supply and capability gaps if new import restrictions take effect.
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Adam Welsh, head of global policy for DJI, told the Michigan House oversight subcommittee on homeland security and foreign influence at a hearing that DJI has built multiple data-security controls into its products and that broad restrictions on imports would create immediate gaps for public-safety agencies and private-sector users.
Welsh said DJI’s approach includes a “local data mode” that prevents a drone from connecting to cellular networks, onboard receivers for manned-aircraft signals and early adoption of the FAA’s Remote ID standard. “We don’t make money from data,” Welsh said, adding that flight logs and consumer media are not uploaded to DJI servers unless users explicitly opt in.
The discussion centered on three topics the committee flagged as urgent: data security, single-source market concentration, and supply-chain fragility. Committee members pressed Welsh about audits, past federal scrutiny and a provision of this year’s National Defense Authorization Act that could bar new DJI models from U.S. sales if an intelligence review is not completed by the specified deadline.
Why it matters: state and local law enforcement, fire departments, utilities and agricultural operators rely extensively on small unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) for search and rescue, infrastructure inspection and other missions. Welsh told the panel that DJI products account for roughly “70 plus percent of the overall consumer and commercial market” and that some estimates put the company “around 90% of the agricultural market.” He warned that a regulatory or statutory bar on new DJI products would leave agencies without ready alternatives in the near term.
Details from testimony and committee questioning
Data controls and auditing: Welsh described four principles DJI uses for data security: transparency and education, giving users control, operating on a zero-trust assumption for companies domiciled in China, and community collaboration. He said the company performs independent audits, runs a bug-bounty program and offers an explicit Local Data Mode that, when activated, prevents any network transmission from the drone during the flight. Welsh said DJI introduced Remote ID functionality for its products well before the FAA rulemaking made it law in 2024 and that all DJI aircraft over half a pound include ADS‑B receivers to warn operators of nearby manned aircraft.
On audits, Welsh said the U.S. Department of the Interior and Idaho National Laboratory reviews (commissioned by DHS) inspected DJI equipment and “found no evidence of data leakage.” He also said a Pentagon technical review of two DJI products included reverse engineering of algorithms and that the company passed that review.
What DJI no longer stores: Welsh said DJI removed a previously offered flight‑log storage service (hosted on U.S. Amazon Web Services servers) and erased records that users had stored there; he said that change was made “as of June” (no year specified in testimony) and that enterprise customers now must rely on third‑party operators for cloud storage.
Geofencing and unlocking: Welsh said DJI originally built geofencing — software limits tied to a map of controlled airspace and other sensitive sites — into products to give regulators time to adapt. He told the committee DJI later removed geofencing in a firmware update after regulators had not adopted a comparable solution and because first responders were frequently requesting unlocks. “We were getting complaints from first responders and others that it was hampering their ability to do their jobs,” he said.
Supply-chain and imports: Committee members noted difficulty finding DJI products in U.S. channels. Welsh said the current shortage is the result of U.S. Customs processing issues that are preventing shipments from clearing, and he said customs is also blocking spare parts, creating repair backlogs. He acknowledged that some parts are not manufactured in the U.S. and that rebuilding a fully domestic supply chain would be costly and take time.
On federal restrictions and the NDAA provision: Welsh repeatedly urged technical review rather than immediate exclusion. He described a provision in the National Defense Authorization Act (referenced during the hearing as “section 1709”) that requires a national intelligence review of certain manufacturers and said the statute does not designate a single agency to do the review; he warned that if no agency completes the review by the NDAA deadline the company could be placed on a Federal Communications Commission “covered list,” which would prevent new product certifications in the United States and effectively bar new models from the market.
Committee concerns and examples: Several committee members described public-safety uses as well as national-security worries. Representative Meerman (subcommittee member) described a winter search in his district in which a drone helped locate a missing resident. Representative Menser asked why DJI equipment was out of stock; Welsh answered that U.S. Customs issues and parts shortages are the cause. Representative Kallen asked about the immediate downside to public-safety if imports were banned; Welsh cited a Government Accountability Office review that found U.S. domestic alternatives could be four to five times more expensive, take months to deliver and, in some cases, arrive in an unflightworthy condition.
Remaining open questions: Committee members repeatedly asked for independent, ongoing validation of product security. Welsh said DJI would accept continued scrutiny and suggested a model where the company funds technical audits by experts empaneled or chosen in cooperation with the U.S. government. Representatives also pressed on China’s National Intelligence Law and whether DJI could be compelled to turn over data; Welsh said DJI’s principal operational safeguard is not collecting or retaining flight and sensor data centrally when it is not needed.
Ending: The committee did not take formal action during the hearing. Members said they will continue deliberations, noting the upcoming statutory review deadlines and ongoing federal and state concerns about single-source dependency for an expanding technology used by emergency responders, utilities and farmers.

